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INTRODUCTION
Although claims predicated on harm caused by defective products sounding
in warranty and negligence, aided and abetted by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, existed well before the twentieth century, product liability as we now
know it was initially foreshadowed in Ohio in the seminal case of Rogers v. Toni
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Home Permanent Co.2 Shortly after the true product liability revolution began,3
Ohio joined the revolution with the adoption of strict liability in warranty
without privity in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.4 The Ohio Supreme Court then
recognized that this approach to strict liability was no different from the more
recognized concept of strict liability in tort and adopted this principle as
enunciated in the Restatement of Torts.5 The common law evolution of Ohio
product liability law culminated with abandonment of the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement of the Restatement definition 6 and recognition that
the doctrine of strict liability in tort encompassed crashworthiness or second
collision liability.7
Enactment of the Ohio Product Liability Act (the "Act"),8 which took effect
on January 5,1988, created an exclusive statutory basis for all tort based product
liability claims.9 The statute, while eliminating the term "strict liability in tort,"
2167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958), allowing an injured consumer to bring a
direct action in warranty against the manufacturer despite the absence of privity. Cf.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). [Note: Due to the nature of
this article, parallel citations are provided for Ohio decisions.]
3 The confluence of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); and adoption of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) led to the national demise of the privity
requirement and acceptance of the principles of strict liability in tort which had been
forcefully urged in Justice Traynor's famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944). Shortly thereafter, with adoption of the
crashworthiness doctrine in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
the foundation for modem product liability law was in place.
46 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
STemple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
6 Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 464-5, n.2, 432 N.E.2d 814,817 n.2,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
7 Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
8OHio REV. CODE §§ 2307.71-2307.80. For purposes of the Act, "Product" is defined
as "any object, substance, mixture, or raw materials that constitutes tangible personal
property" and meets other requirements as to ability to be delivered, commerce and
trade. The term does not include human tissue, blood, or organs. OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2307.71(L). A vapor recovery system used to evacuate gasoline fumes from holding
tanks was held to be tangible personal property within this statutory definition as
distinct from a fixture which would have been beyond the Act's purview. Wireman v.
Keneco Distributors, 75 Ohio St.3d 103, 661 N.E.2d 744 (19%). Cf. The "all things...
which are moveable. . ." definition of "Goods" set forth in the Uniform Commercial
Code, OHIO REV. CODE § 1302.01(8).
9 The Ohio Product Liability Act does not bar actions based on contract law where
there is privity between the seller and members of the buyer's family or household and
guests. See OHIO REV. CODE § 1302.31, Bruns v. Cooper Indus. Inc., 78 Ohio App. 3d 428,
605 N.E.2d 395 (1992). In actions for economic loss between commercial parties that are
in privity of contract, the Ohio Uniform Commercial Code provides the exclusive
remedy. See Sun Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 68 Ohio St. 3d 397,
[Vol. 43:379
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is primarily a codification of preexisting common law. The Act provides that
product liability claims may be predicated on one of four theories: defects in
manufacture or construction;10 defects in design or formulation;11 defect in
warning or instruction,12 and failure to conform to representation. 13 Each of
these theories had previously been recognized by the courts. For example, the
requirements for a cause of action predicated on a defect in design virtually
mirror the former law of strict liability in tort. As with the former law, to prevail
in a product liability claim the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, the existence of a defect at the time the product left the control of
the manufacturer and that the defect was a proximate cause of the harm for
which recovery is sought.
14
Since its adoption, efforts to amend the Act have been ongoing. The most
recent effort would, among other things, apply comparative fault principles to
product liability claims and provide a defense based on substance abuse.15 In
addition, preemptive federal legislation has been passed in both houses of
Congress 16 which would, if enacted, have a significant effect upon Ohio
product liability law.17 The American Law Institute is now drafting a
Restatement of Products Liability under the leadership of Co-Reporters James
A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski. Drafts of several sections have been
completed which, if adopted by the Institute, would represent a highly
regarded source of new approaches to product liability law.18 If Ohio accepts
627 N.E.2d 552 (1994); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42
Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624 (1989).
10OHio REV. CODE § 2307.74.
11OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75.
12 OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.76.
13 OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.77.
14 0HiO REV. CODE §§ 2307.73, 2307.75(A).
15 S.B. No. 148, H.B. No. 350,121st Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1995-96). These bills
contain proposed amendments to the Ohio Revised Code including: §§ 2307.31 and
2307.32 (contribution and comparative fault allocation); § 2307.73 (limiting the use of
circumstantial evidence and addressing market share liability as well as successor
corporate liability); § 2307.75 (abolishing the consumer expectancy test); §§ 2315.19 and
2315.20 (comparative fault); § 2317.45 (abrogating the collateral benefits rule); § 2323.59
(substance abuse defense); and § 4513.263 (expanding the seat belt defense). A fuller
description of the major legislative changes is set forth infra Part VII.
16 H.R. 956,104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995); S. 565,104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995). This Act
was passed by Congress and subsequently vetoed by President Clinton on May 2,1996.
17 The power of the federal government to enact such a statute and the
constitutionality of the proposed national statute of repose are discussed in Stephen J.
Werber, The Constitutional Dimension of A National Products Liability Statute of Repose, 40
VILL. L. REV. 985 (1995).
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Council Draft No. 3 (Nov.
15, 1995).
1995]
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the premises of this new Restatement, through amendment of the Act, the effect
on the state's law of product liability would be significant.
I. THE CAUSE OF ACIoN
A. Defects in Manufacture or Construction (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.74)
A defect in manufacture or construction can exist even if the manufacturer
has "exercised all possible care."19 This is consistent with the basic premise of
preexisting law as fault is irrelevant to claims based on strict liability in tort. A
product is defective, for purposes of this section, if two elements are met:
1. The product deviated in a material way from its
manufacturer's design specifications, formula, or
performance standards; and
2. The defect existed when the product left the control of its
manufacturer.
These standards, though not fault based, reflect inadequate conduct on the
part of a manufacturer. Nonconformance of the type required would be
avoided by properly applied quality control standards. This section of the Act
eliminates the consumer expectancy test for manufacture defect which had
been judicially adopted. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,20 the
court reviewed its precedents to determine whether sufficient evidence of a
defect existed to permit liability after a six-month old automobile caught fire.
The decision appears to distinguish between the law applicable to manufacture
defects and that applicable to design defects in that it adopts the consumer
expectancy test for a manufacture defect. Thus, "a product may be proven to
be in a defective condition if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."2 1
Manufacture defect cases are relatively easy to prove, though expert
testimony will often be needed to establish the non-compliance and/or the
time the defect came into existence. 22 For example, automobile seat tracks are
often welded to the chassis. Specifications will provide the number, size,
spacing, and strength of the welds for each track. If a track breaks loose during
a collision the failure can be categorized in one of three ways: (1) an
unavoidable and nonactionable failure; (2) a manufacture defect; or (3) a design
defect. 23 If the track separation resulted from fewer welds than specified or
other failure to conform to the specifications, it is a manufacture flaw actionable
under this section. A metallurgist would be needed to establish that the weld
19 0HIo REV. CODE § 2307.74.
2037 Ohio St. 3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 489 (1988).
21id. at 6, 523 N.E.2d at 493. The decision's analysis of circumstantial evidence and
permissible inferences is set forth infra note 333 and accompanying text.
22Expert testimony is discussed infra Part V.
23Design defect is discussed infra Part I(B).
[Vol. 43:379
HeinOnline  -- 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 384 1995
OHIO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
failure was caused by a manufacture defect rather than excessive force or prior
damage to the weld. In some situations it may not be possible to determine
whether the defect was of manufacture or design origin. In such cases an
injured party can prevail by submitting sufficient evidence that one or the other
had to exist and was the cause of harm. 24
An early example of manufacture defect is found in Lonzrick.25 Plaintiff, a
structural iron worker, was injured when steel joists manufactured by the
defendant collapsed and fell. The court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals which had overturned the trial court's ruling dismissing the action. No
clear definition of defect was provided. Rather, the court spoke in warranty
language of a product that was not merchantable or fit for its ordinary intended
use. In closing, the court observed that there is liability for sale of a product
which, if defective, "will be a dangerous instrumentality."26
More recently, a federal court applying Ohio law denied summary judgment
because there was sufficient evidence of a material deviation from design
specifications in the manufacture of an airplane engine. 27 The decision also
addressed the element of proximate cause.
Even a properly designed and manufactured product can reflect a
manufacture defect. In such cases the analogy to the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose is strong. Thus, where a manufacturer sent a chemical
that did not comport with the buyer's specifications, a defect was present even
though the chemical was properly manufactured. 28
The requirement that the manufacture defect exist at the time of manufacture
is not superfluous despite the fact that, by definition, this must be so. The
failure to establish this factor can defeat an otherwise valid claim.29 The
requirement makes clear that subsequent unforeseeable modifications take the
case beyond the purview of a manufacture defect. This requirement is more
fully discussed below.
24 See Werlin v. B. & O.R.R., 32 Ohio App. 3d 14,513 N.E.2d 353 (1987), where expert
testimony supported the conclusion that a tractor drive shaft fractured because it was
undersized (design) or had been improperly hardened (manufacture).
256 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
261d. at 240, 218 N.E.2d at 194.
27 In re Air Crash Disaster, 781 F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
28 Greenwood v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No. 89CA004598, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
1503 (Lorain County Apr. 18,1990).
29See, e.g., Bruns v. Cooper Indus. Inc., 78 Ohio App. 3d 428,433,605 N.E.2d 395, 398
(1992); Phillips v. Wright Bernet, Inc., No. CA 93-01-010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2882
(Butler County June 7,1993).
19951
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B. Defects in Design or Formulation (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75)
1. Defining Defect
Perhaps the most highly litigated and costly defect claims are those
surrounding design defect allegations. Such claims bear on entire product lines
and, if successful, force manufacturers to consider the need for recall
campaigns and/or retrofitting, and design changes for future products.30 A
duty to inform government agencies may also be present. The wrong decision
can yield government sanctions or imposition of punitive damages in
subsequent litigation. Consistent with prior decisional law the Act provides
that such defects exist if:
1. When it left the control of the manufacturer the foreseeable
risks associated with the design exceeded the benefits of that
design, or
2. The product is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer
would expect when it is used in an intended or reasonably
foreeseeable manner.
The first standard is generally described as risk/benefit analysis. The
definition was previously adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court.31 However,
where the case law often allowed for a determination of defect to be made with
benefit of hindsight, the Act abolishes the use of this approach. The second,
alternative definition, known as the consumer expectancy test, was initially
adopted in Temple v. Wean United, Inc.32 as it represents the defect definition of
the Restatement.33 A product is defective in design if it fails either test. Neither
definition requires that the design create a product that is "unreasonably
dangerous," an element that was rejected in Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.34 Both
3 0Recalls can entail substantial financial costs and adverse public relations.
Questions concerning the extent to which recall notification letters are admissible, and
the extent of their relevance, have been addressed by a number of courts. See generally
Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1980); Barry v. Manglass, 389
N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div. 1976); Matsko v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 473 A.2d 155 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984).
There is a relative paucity of decisions applying Ohio law. The one published Ohio
decision, Miles v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio App. 3d 186, 460 N.E.2d 1377
(1983), is of limited assistance as it is limited to a determination that the contents of the
notification are inadmissible hearsay in regard to a party other than its sender. Federal
courts in Ohio will be guided by decisions such as Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894
F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); Bryan v. Emerson Elec. Co., 856 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1988); and
Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984).
3 1See Cremeans v. International Harvester Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 232, 452 N.E.2d 1281
(1983); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 857 (1982).
3250 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) § 402A cmt. i (1965).
3469 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
[Vol. 43:379
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are consistent with strict liability in tort which renders the degree of care
utilized by the manufacturer irrelevant.35
Although analysis under the consumer expectancy standard is legally
viewed as objective,36 it is actually quite subjective, whereas analysis under
risk-benefit is theoretically and actually objective. Despite the absence of a fault
principle, a negligence calculus is implicit in consumer expectancy and express
in risk-benefit which is no more than a refined application of a well known
negligence formula.37 Numerous cases have recognized and applied
risk-benefit analysis.3 8 The Act, consistent with prior law, provides a
non-exclusive list of factors to consider when determining the degree of risk
posed as well as the benefits associated with that design.39 In addition, the
judicially recognized concept of an unavoidably unsafe product is carried
forward in the Act. Such products are not defective provided that adequate
warning is given or unnecessary.40
An important aspect of the Act's provisions regarding design defect is set
forth in Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.75(F). This section provides that a product
is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time the product left the
control of its manufacturer, a practical and technically feasible alternative
design was not available. If a claimant cannot produce such evidence, the
defense is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The sole exception to this
3 5RESTATEMENT § 402A (2)(a), provides that its liability rule applies although "the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." This
principle has been part of Ohio decisional law since Temple and remains valid even
though Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75, unlike § 2307.74, contains no express language to this
effect.
36 For example, the Sixth Circuit has stated that whether a defect claim predicated on
the consumer expectancy standard is applicable is for the jury to decide and that, if so,
the test to be applied by that jury is "an objective one, to be examined with an eye toward
the expectation of the 'ordinary consumer'. Birchfield v. International Harvester Co.,
726 F.2d 1131,1135-36 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
3 7Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d.
Cir. 1947), suggested thata party is liable for negligent conduct if the burden of adequate
precaution to prevent the harm is less than the gravity of the resulting injury multiplied
by the probability of harm.
38 See, e.g., Carrel v. Allied Prods. Corp., No. 9-94-24, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091
(Marion County July 11, 1995) (summary judgment in favor of a press manufacturer
was affirmed with emphasis on the fact that there was no "foreseeable risk" as the press
had not caused injury for a twenty year period despite the absence of certain safety
devices); Gilbert v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., No. 13819,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
5966 (Montgomery County Dec. 17,1993) (plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
through expert testimony, showing that the risks inherent in a vehicle windshield
retention system outweighed its benefits).
39 OHio REV. CODE § 2307.75(B) and (C).
40 OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.76 (B) and (C). These provisions are discussed infra Part
I(C).
1995]
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non-defect rule is that there can be liability if the manufacturer acted
unreasonably in introducing the product into trade or commerce.41
2. Subsequent Modification/Alteration
By 1977, with the adoption of the Restatement definition of strict liability in
tort, it was clear that to prevail a plaintiff had to establish that the product
reached the consumer or user "without substantial change in the condition in
which it [was] sold."42 In cases where this burden could not be met a motion
for summary judgment would often be granted. The Act carries forward this
concept, but only as part of the calculus for determination of whether a defect
exists.43 To the extent that an unforeseeable or unreasonable modification or
alteration is viewed as breaking the chain of proximate causation, it will remain
a full defense. To the extent that the change is insufficient to break this chain,
it will be viewed only as a factor. Moreover, if the type of change delineated in
this section of the Act exists, it could make it impossible for the plaintiff to
establish that the defect existed when the product "left the control of its
manufacturer."44 Despite the change made by the Act, case outcome will rarely,
if ever, be affected.
The alteration requirement was fully discussed in Temple and its reasoning
remains valid. This case involved a power punch press which, when sold, had
vertical dual activating buttons at shoulder height. A purchaser of the press
altered this system by installing horizontal face up activating buttons at waist
level which were twenty-four inches apart. When a piece of stock fell upon the
buttons the press was inadvertently activated and caused the injury to plaintiff.
Absent the modification this activation could nothave occurred. The court held
that the installation of waist high activation buttons was a "substantial change"
in a unit that contained no original defect.45
4 1OiIo REV. CODE § 2307.75(F).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORm § 402A (1)(b) as adopted in Temple v. Wean
United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). The court adopted section 402A
and its comments in their entirety.
4 3OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75(B) specifies the factors to be considered in making a
determination of foreseeable risk. Sub-paragraph (B)(1) then states as one of these
factors:
The nature and magnitude of the risks of harm associated with that
design or formulation in light of the intended and reasonably foresee-
able use, modifications, or alterations of the product.
Similar language is contained in sub-paragraph (B)(3), addressing the likelihood of
harm.
44 OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.75(A)(1).
45 A claim against the manufacturer of the installed operating buttons was also
dismissed as this component supplier had no knowledge that its components "were to
be fashioned or fabricated into the power press in the particular manner that they were."
Temple, 50 Ohio St. 2d at324-25, 364 N.E.2d at 272. Liability of component part suppliers
is more fully discussed infra Part W(C).
[Vol. 43:379
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Additional Decisions
Kobza v. General Motors Corp.46 Alteration of an automobile transmission
linkage system is a material alteration even though the system was removable
after it left control of the manufacturer. Any change which increases the
likelihood of a malfunction which is the proximate cause of injury is a
substantial change. Where the change was neither expected nor intended by
the manufacturer, a directed verdict is appropriate.
King v. K. R. Wilson Co. 47 Summary judgment in favor of a manufacturer was
upheld where the activation system of a die cast trim machine was modified
in a manner found to be a substantial alteration and plaintiff failed to provide
sufficient evidence that such a change was foreseeable.
Love v. Mack Trucks, Inc.48 Directed verdict in favor of manufacturer upheld
where plaintiff's injuries were caused by the failure of a fifth wheel which was
installed subsequent to manufacture and sale as a means to join a tractor and
trailer rig. The installation contradicted warnings about the installation of a
fifth wheel. There was no evidence that the tractor was defective when it left
the control of its manufacturer.
Behanan v. Desco Distribution Co.49 Press machine manufacturer granted
summary judgment where a safety device, installed at the time of delivery, had
been disabled. Under these circumstances plaintiff failed to show that he was
entitled to compensatory damages pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2307.73.
Cox v. Oliver Machine Co.50 Directed verdict properly denied where
manufacturer could foresee a subsequent alteration due to its knowledge that
the owner could repair and maintain the saw.
C. Defects in Warning or Instructions (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307. 76)
Through the 1980s warning claims were generally viewed as affirmative
defenses to strict liability actions rather than as a cause of action in strict
liability.51 This approach was invalidated in Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 52
4668 Ohio App. 3d 742, 580 N.E.2d 47 (1989).
478 Ohio St. 3d 9, 455 N.E.2d 1282 (1983).
4827 Ohio App. 3d 198, 500 N.E.2d 328 (1985).
4998 Ohio App. 3d 23, 647 N.E.2d 830 (1994). The relationship between product
misuse/abuse and alteration is not clearly delineated. The wedging of a piece of
cardboard into the machine to defeat the safety feature in Behanan could have been
described as an unforeseeable misuse. See also Burrows v. Fastener Eng'rs, Inc., 78 Ohio
App. 3d 388,604 N.E.2d 838 (1992) (removal of safety guard unforseeable even though
designed to be moved); Stombaugh v. National Lime & Stone Co., No. 16-89-18, 1991
OhioApp. LEXIS 127 (WyandotCounty Jan. 15,1991) (disconnection of air compressor's
electrical shut-down system).
5041 Ohio App. 3d 28,534 N.E.2d 855 (1987).
5 1See, e.g., Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1983).
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which recognized a strict liability in tort failure to warn claim as an alternative
to a negligence based claim. The court took the approach previously
announced in Krosky v. Ohio Edison Co.53 The Crislip court held:
In a products liability case where a claimant seeks recovery for failure
to warn or warn adequately, it must be proven that the manufacturer
knew, or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, of the
risk or hazard about which it failed to warn. Further, there will be no
liability unless it be shown that the manufacturer failed to take the
precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the
product to the public. Thus, the standard imposed upon the defendant in a
strict liability claim grounded upon inadequate warning is the same as that
imposed in a negligence claim .... 54
The primary reason for adopting the doctrine was to avoid application of
comparative negligence principles.
This claim, both at common law and under the Act, is patterned on, and
follows, Restatement of Torts (Second) section 402A, Comment j. The claim
applies to both warnings and instructions. A warning is provided to alert users
to particular dangers of a product when used in an intended or foreseeable
manner. An instruction advises a user as to the proper manner in which to use
the product. Due to their relative simplicity and low cost, a substantial number
of failure to warn claims have been brought.
The principles were codified in Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.76 which
provides for a cause of action without regard to strict liability or negligence
labels (but without application of comparative negligence), based upon the
following:
1. Products can be defective due to inadequate warnings or
instructions if, when the product left the control of the
manufacturer:
a. the manufacturer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known of a risk; and
b. the manufacturer failed to provide warning or instruction
that a reasonable manufacturer would have provided in
light of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness of that
harm.
2. Similar liability is imposed for failure to provide a
post-marketing warning or instruction where the
5252 Ohio St. 3d 251, 556 N.E.2d 1177 (1990). Section 2307.76 was utilized to support
a failure to wam claim against the original installer and subsequent seller of a gasoline
storage plant where vapors entered an empty tank resulting in an explosion that led to
the death of plaintiff's decedent. Wireman v. Keneco Distributors, 75 Ohio St.3d 103,
661 N.E.2d 744 (1996).
5320 Ohio App. 3d 10, 484 N.E.2d 704 (1984).
5452 Ohio St. 3d at 257, 556 N.E.2d at 1182-83 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
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manufacturer learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should learn of, a risk of harm associated with the product.
3. A product is not defective for failure to warn or instruct about
an open and obvious risk or a risk that is a matter of common
knowledge.
4. A special provision is made in regard to ethical drugs which
incorporates the learned intermediary defense.
55
5. The failure to warn or instruct must be a proximate cause of
the alleged injury.
In order to meet the duty to provide an adequate warning or instruction, the
manufacturer must be sure that its warnings/instructions meet the following
norms:
1. Specificity: identification of the precise danger and harm - a
general "may be harmful" is inadequate.
2. Clarity: the language must be clear and understandable to the
reasonable person.
3. Conspicuousness: the warning must be set forth in a place and
manner which will call the users' attention to it. This can be
done by use of bold print, colors, etc.
56
4. Avoidability: instruction as to how the danger can be
prevented, if this is possible, must be provided.
5. Audience: subject to exceptions, the warning must be
designed to reach the end user.
In appropriate cases the use of pictures or symbols should be considered.
The level of hazard must also be indicated. "Danger" is used to describe the
most serious hazard level; 'Warning" is used to show that serious injury or
death could result; and "Caution" is used to illustrate lesser injury potential.
Quite often the color red is associated with "Danger" and yellow with
"Caution." Unless mandated by applicable regulation, there is no color code.
The clearest decisions regarding how a warning must be presented to meet
the duty are Crislip and Freas v. Prater Construction Corp.57 In Crislip, despite
fairly detailed instructions and warnings, a cause of action was stated as there
was no indication that venting of the add-on furnace should not utilize the
same flue as the gas heater nor was there an indication that improper venting
could lead to asphyxiation. In Freas, multiple warnings and instructions
regarding the dangers of dismantling a crane improperly were sufficient. The
court emphasized the manual's clear instruction that incorrect boom removal
could result in personal injury or death, that no one should ever stand under
55See Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 58 Ohio St. 3d 147, 569 N.E.2d 875
(1991).
56Cf U.C.C. disclaimer and limitation of liability rules. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1302.29
and 1302.93.
5760 Ohio St. 3d 6,573 N.E.2d 27 (1991). See also Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio
St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981).
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the boom when removing the bolts, and that eight boldface warnings were
provided with each preceded by an exclamation mark e.g., "CAUTION:
Incorrect boom removal or disassembly may result in machine damage,
personal injury or death. Never allow anyone.., to stand on, in, or under the boom
when removing splice bolts or connecting pins."58 The court observed that "[AIll
warnings . . .appear in bold-face type and are highlighted by a white
exclamation mark in a dark triangle,"59 and that "[t]he warnings are readable,
conspicuous, and understandable."60
Additional Decisions
1. Defective when Left Control of Manufacturer
(Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(A)(1)):
Phillips v. Wright Bernet, Inc. 61 Danger of operating a brush flagging machine
with brushes that were not flat and rectangular was not foreseeable at time of
manufacture in 1965 (injury in 1990).
2. Failure to Warn or Instruct (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.76(A)(1)):
Leibreich v. A.J. Refrigeration, InC.62 Party that designed and assembled final
product, as distinct from the manufacturer of the non-defective component
parts, could be liable for failure to warn.
Sapp v. Stoney-Ridge Truck Tire.63 Tire manufacturer not required to warn of
all potential abuse and misuse of its product.
Kelly v. Cairns & Bros., Inc.64 Fire helmet manufacturer under no duty to warn
of additional protective accessories.
3. Post-Market Failure (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(A)(2))
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. 65 Filing of a similar suit five weeks
earlier was insufficient notice to establish post-market liability.
5860 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 573 N.E.2d at 31.
591d. at 7, 573 N.E.2d at 29.
60Id. at 10, 573 N.E.2d at 31.
61No. CA93-01-010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2882 (Butler County June 7,1993).
6267 Ohio St. 3d 266,617 N.E.2d 1068 (1993) (parking brake). Liability of component
part suppliers/manufacturers is more fully discussed infra Part IV(C).
6386 Ohio App. 3d 85,619 N.E.2d 1172 (1993).
6489 Ohio App. 3d 598, 626 N.E.2d 986 (1993).
6530 Ohio St. 3d 60,507 N.E.2d 331 (1987). The primary focus of this decision concerns
corporate successor liability which is discussed infra Part IV(A).
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4. Preemption
Federal law in many product areas provides standards for warnings which
may preempt state law. Numerous decisions have addressed this and related
safety standard issues.66 A recent appellate decision 67 ruled that federal law
does not bar a design defect claim based on the failure of an automobile
manufacturer to install a passenger-side air bag in a 1987 automobile even
though the vehicle complied with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
208, which did not require this restraint system.
D. The Unavoidably Unsafe Product (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75)
By virtue of their inherent characteristics, certain products present dangers
of harm which cannot be designed out of the product. Such a product may be
marketed and found non-defective provided that it is properly prepared and
accompanied by an adequate warning.68 This principle is summarized in the
Restatement of Torts (Second) section 402(A), comment k, which focuses on
products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are incapable of
being made safe for their intended use. When in compliance with these
standards, such products are not defective. Though often applied to drugs and
vaccines, this doctrine is applicable to any product with such inherent danger
potential.
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.71(P) defines unavoidably unsafe to mean
"in the state of technical, scientific, and medical knowledge at the time a
product in question left the control of its manufacturer, an aspect of that
product was incapable of being made safe." This definition applies to all
products within the purview of the Act and clearly establishes the time frame
reference point.
This general definition must be read in conjunction with the specific
definition provided in regard to products which are allegedly defective in
design or formulation. Ohio Revised Code section 2307.75(E) provides that a
product is not defective in design or formulation if the harm was caused by "an
inherent characteristic of the product which is a generic aspect of the product
that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the product's
usefulness or desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with
66 See generally Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 64 U.S.L.W. 4625 (U.S. June 26, 1996);
Freightliner Corp. v. Ben Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992); Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 67 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir.
1995); Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 69 Ohio St. 3d 541, 634 N.E.2d 998 (1994); In re
Miamisburg Train Derailment Litig., 68 Ohio St. 3d 255,626 N.E.2d 85, cert. denied, Union
Tank Car Co. v. Various Plaintiffs in Class, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
67 Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-L-106,1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5722 (Lake County
Dec. 22,1995).
68 An exception may arise where the utility of the product is so low, in comparison
to the degree of danger created, as to make Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75(F), applicable.
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the ordinary knowledge common to the community." This definition
incorporates aspects of risk/benefit analysis and consumer expectancy.
Although the definition of the term "unavoidably unsafe" has general
application, the only statutory application is set forth in Ohio Revised Code
section 2307.75(D). This section provides that ethical drugs or ethical medical
devices69 are not defective because some aspect is unavoidably unsafe if its
manufacturer provides adequate warning and instruction as set forth in Ohio
Revised Code section 2307.76.70
Additional Decisions
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co.71 This seminal decision interprets and applies
Comment k to the oral contraceptive, Ovulen, an unavoidably unsafe ethical
medicine. Consistent with the subsequent Act, Syllabus 1 provides:
A manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe ethical (prescription) drug
is not strictly liable in tort to a consumer who has suffered injury as a
result of ingesting that drug where the manufacturer has provided
adequate warning to the medical profession of all potential adverse
reactions inherent in the use of the drug which the manufacturer, being
held to the standards of an expert in the field, knew or should have
known to exist at the time of marketing.72
Syllabus 5 provides that the duty to warn is satisfied "by providing adequate
warnings to the medical profession and not to the ultimate user."73
Renfro v. Black.74 Due to alleged malpractice, a drug, chymodiactin, leaked
into plaintiff's intrathecal space causing nerve damage. Paraplegia followed
the ensuing surgery. There is no indication that the drug was unavoidably
unsafe, but this is a logical assumption. Plaintiff asserted that a manufacturer's
warning sent to the doctor shortly before the surgery was inadequate as "it was
69 An ethical drug means a prescription drug prescribed or dispensed by a physician
or other authorized person. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.71(D). An ethical medical device is
a medical device prescribed, dispensed, or implanted by a physician or other authorized
person. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.71(E).
70 An alternative defense to manufacturers of ethical drugs, as distinct from ethical
medical devices, the learned intermediary doctrine, is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2307.76(C).
7167 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981).
72 1d. at 423 N.E.2d at 834.
73 Waming must be given to the ultimate consumer if applicable regulations of the
F.D.A. so provide. In Seley, a voluntary warning was provided to the plaintiff. The court
held that the adequacy of this warning, under the "voluntary duty" doctrine, was not
relevant if adequate warning was provided to the physician. This exception would not
apply to situations in which a warning to the consumer is required by law.
7452 Ohio St. 3d 27, 556 N.E.2d 150 (1990).
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unduly delayed, reluctant in tone or lacking in a sense of urgency.' 75 Though
this is an accurate statement of law, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury
accordingly was not an abuse of discretion as the delay in issuing the warning
was not a cause of the harm sustained.
White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.76 Whether a product is unavoidably unsafe
is to be determined on a case by case basis, not merely because it is a drug,
vaccine, or other product. DTP, properly prepared, is an unavoidably unsafe
product rendered non-defective by virtue of an adequate warning. Plaintiff's
claim that this product was not unavoidably unsafe due to the possible use of
a less dangerous vaccine was rejected. The alternative vaccine proposed by
plaintiff was not approved by the FDA and there was no evidence that such a
vaccine could have been marketed at the relevant time.
Burwell v. American Edwards Laboratories.77 Spontaneous degeneration of
porcine heart valve is unavoidable thereby rendering the valve unavoidably
unsafe. It was proper to instruct the jury on the law of unavoidably unsafe
products rather than the consumer expectancy test.78
E. Defect by Failure to Conform to Representation (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.77)
This claim can be brought without regard to whether the representation was
fraudulently, negligently, or recklessly made. It requires only that the product,
when it left the control of its manufacturer, failed to conform to a representation
made by that manufacturer. This provision negates the common law
requirement of fault for misrepresentation actions and parallels aspects of
traditional express warranty by affirmation or promise.79 As in commercial
law, the representation becomes a basis of the bargain, but other technical
requirements of warranty law are inapplicable. Actionable representations can
be made through advertising, as part of an owner's manual, by oral statement
of an agent, or in other forms.
Plaintiff's recovery in the well known Rogers decision was predicated on a
representation that the hair care product was safe and harmless. To prevail in
such an action under the Act the plaintiff must establish: (1) that the
representation was of a material fact concerning the quality or character of the
751d. at 30, 556 N.E.2d at 153, relying on Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 423 N.E.2d at
837.
7640 Ohio St.3d 390, 533 N.E.2d 748 (1988). Accord Ackley v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 919
F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Ohio law to find vaccine unavoidably unsafe, that
waming was adequate, and finding that no safer alternative vaccine could be legally
marketed).
7762 Ohio App. 3d 73, 574 N.E.2d 1094 (1989).
78 See also Blatt v. Hamilton, No. 85AP-835, 1986 WL 2925 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin
County, Mar. 6,1986) (prescription acne medicine held non-defective due to an adequate
warning as to side effects); Layne v. GAF Corp., 42 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 537 N.E.2d 252
(C.P. 1988) (jury charge on unavoidably unsafe products in an asbestos action).
79 Cf. OHIO REV. CODE § 1302.26.
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product; (2) nonconformance with that representation; (3) justifiable reliance
upon the representation; and (4) proximate cause.80
Additional Decisions
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.81 Advertising representations as to a
jeep's off-road handling characteristics and the physical appearance of its
"roll-bar" contributed to a conclusion that it was not crashworthy and to an
award of punitive damages.
Jordan v. Paccar, Inc.82 A manufacturer's statements as to the strength of a
truck cab fiberglass roof were deemed mere puffing beyond the purview of
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.77.
Tittle v. Rent-A-Wreck, Division of Marheka Chevrolet, Buick, Inc.83 Summary
judgment found improper where a vehicle lessor told plaintiff that the vehicle
"drove good" and could be driven, after plaintiff had complained of defective
steering. The decision was based on Ohio Revised Code section 2307.78.
F. Crashworthiness/Second Collision/Enhanced Injury Liability
Following the ground breaking decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,84
the common law of crashworthiness or second collision liability swept the
nation. The doctrine imposes liability upon product manufacturers for
injurious consequences of collisions without regard to whether a product
defect caused the collision. The principle imposes liability for injuries that were
either (a) not prevented, or (b) enhanced by a design or manufacture defect in
the product which came into play after the initial collision. 85
The term crashworthiness references the principle that a manufacturer is
obligated to provide a product that is reasonably safe in collision sequences.
There is a duty to design and manufacture a product that will provide
reasonable protection against collision related injuries. The term "second
8 0Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 96 Ohio App. 3d 160, 644 N.E.2d 731 (1994)
(reliance was not reasonable as advertising did not negate the known dangers of
alcohol). The elements set forth in Gawloski are consistent with the definition of
representation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.71(N) which provides that
representation means "an express representation of a material fact concerning the
character, quality, or safety of a product."
8167 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). This decision was not based on
nonconformity as a defect, but is illustrative of the impact representations can have upon
case outcome.
8237 F.3d 1181 (6th Cir. 1994).
8 3No. 92-B-51, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4563 (Belmont County Sept. 24, 1993).
84391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
85 Though often involving passenger automobiles, the doctrine encompasses many
other products such as construction equipment, recreational vehicles, airplanes, tractors
and other agricultural equipment, and riding mowers. The list is limited only by
imagination and the facts.
[Vol. 43:379
HeinOnline  -- 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 396 1995
OHIO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
collision" references the fact that in a collision sequence there is a first collision
between the product and something else and a second collision between the
occupants of that product and either the product (such as a vehicle interior), or
something else (such as the ground in an ejection case). The doctrine imposes
liability for harm caused by that second collision. No second collision, as such,
is needed to make a prima facie crashworthiness claim. If the injured party can
point to a defect which failed to prevent injury, or enhanced injury, in the
accident circumstances, the initial elements of the prima facie case have been
made (for example, injuries caused by fire due to impact related fuel system
failure).
The Ohio Supreme Court first recognized the principle of crashworthiness
under the doctrine of strict liability in tort in Leichtamer v. American Motors
Corp..86 The decision was soon followed in Sours v. General Motors Corp..87 Both
cases involved a roll-over accident sequence, although in Leichtamer it was
actually a pitch-over. In Leichtamer, the court provided a general description of
the crashworthiness doctrine:
While a manufacturer is under no obligation to design a "crash proof'
vehicle, an instruction may be given on the issues of strict liability in
tort if the plaintiff adduces sufficient evidence that an unreasonably
dangerous product design proximately caused or enhanced plaintiff's
injuries in the course of a foreseeable use.88
No section of the Ohio Revised Code specifically addresses crashworthiness
claims. However, the Act's definitions of design and manufacture defect,89 as
well as other general provisions, are applicable.
Additional Decisions
1. Application of the Principle
Simpkins v. Starkey.90 Plaintiff was in her stopped automobile, waiting to
turn, when her vehicle was struck by another vehicle. She was wearing a lap
and shoulder belt and claimed injury because the belt permitted her to move
8667 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981) (roll-bar defect).
87717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983) (automobile roof support).
8867 Ohio St. 2d at 465,424 N.E.2d at 575-76 (citations omitted). Other early decisions
include Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (applying
risk/benefit analysis); and Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., No. 80-CA-34,1981
WL 2886 (Ohio Ct. App. Miami County Aug. 18,1981), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio St.
3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983) (enhanced injury resulting from foreseeable though
unintended use of a lawn mower). The Supreme Court decision provides a
comprehensive analysis of collateral estoppel principles, but does not address any
aspect of enhanced injury litigation.
89 0HIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.74 and 2307.75.
90 No. C-860274, 1987 WL 8420 (Ohio Ct. App. Hamilton County, Mar. 25, 1987).
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forward before it locked. She did not strike the vehicle interior. The court
affirmed a directed verdict for General Motors by finding that under any
definition of defect, the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case.
Kitchens v. McKay.91 Plaintiff brought a crashworthiness action against
Volkswagen for injuries sustained when the front end of a VW collapsed in a
two car accident. The trial court ruled that plaintiff's expert witness was not
qualified. This ruling led to a directed verdict in favor of Volkswagen. The
precluded testimony would have identified three alleged defects. In affirming
the directed verdict, the court recognized that the complaint sounded in strict
liability directed toward the crashworthiness of the vehicle and defects which
enhanced or increased plaintiff's injuries as specified in Leichtamer.
Gilbert v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G.92 This decision provides what may
be the most explicit recent discussion of crashworthiness issues despite the fact
that the principle is never cited. The court treats this crashworthiness case in a
manner identical to any other design defect action.
Plaintiff's BMW broke down and was at the side of the highway while being
serviced by a tow truck operator. Plaintiff was behind the wheel trying to start
the car, following instructions of the tow truck operator, when the BMW was
struck from behind. Due to impact deformation the windshield was dislodged
and the raised hood was pushed rearward invading the driver compartment
through the space vacated by the dislodged windshield. Plaintiff was struck as
he was moving forward due to the impact and sustained serious brain damage.
The trial court's directed verdict in favor of BMW was reversed.
The court recognized that a products liability claim based on design defect
requires (1) a defect which existed at time of manufacture, which (2) is the direct
and proximate cause of injury. The court properly held that in crashworthiness
cases the defect must be the cause of harm rather than a cause of harm as in
other products liability claims.93
The court held that to meet the burden of proof in establishing a design defect
claim, the plaintiff had to present evidence to establish foreseeability without
benefit of hindsight. Plaintiff then had to adduce evidence as to the existence
of a defect (through a calculus of product utility, feasibility of alternative
design, and magnitude of foreseeable risk). These proofs were mandated by
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.75. Sufficient expert evidence was provided
on each point as to make a prima facie case showing that the windshield
retention system was defective, relating this to the injury, and showing that
other retention systems were feasible. The court also found that the accident
circumstances were sufficiently foreseeable despite the limitations described in
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc.,94 and other decisions.
9138 Ohio App. 3d 165, 528 N.E.2d 603 (1987).
92No. 13819,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5966 (Montgomery County Dec. 17, 1993).
93 Cf. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.73(A)(2).
9415 Ohio St. 3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984).
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2. Burden of Proof
One of the most difficult questions in the area of crashworthiness litigation
is the division of the burden of proof.95 Courts have taken differing positions
as to whether the plaintiff is obligated to establish the extent of the enhanced
injuries and what those injuries would have been absent the alleged defect or
with an alternative protective design, or whether the defendant is obligated to
establish the absence of such injuries. Plaintiff also must establish that any
dangers created by the alternative design are less significant than those of the
challenged design.
The best authority in Ohio remains the statement in Leichtamer that "[i]n
order to recover, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the enhancement of the injuries was proximately caused by a defective
product unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff [consumer].' " 6 Ohio law
places the burden of proof on plaintiff. This approach, though not universally
followed, is consistent with the principle of law and traditional norms of
pleading and practice.
Relying on the Leichtamer standard, the court in Simpkins held that plaintiff's
personal testimony was inadequate to establish a defect under the consumer
expectancy standard. 97 She admitted reading the vehicle owner's manual
which specified that the system would lessen the chance of injury, but it did
not state that the seat belts would prevent injury. The seat belt system prevented
plaintiff from striking the vehicle interior. The court found that not only did
the belt perform in a manner consistent with plaintiff's subjective expectancy,
but also that it met the reasonable expectations of any ordinary consumer.
Plaintiff's expert recognized the unreeling aspect of the belt design, but failed
to indicate that the design would likely cause injury or present a serious danger.
Nor did the testimony establish that other designs were economically or
mechanically more feasible. Thus, the evidence did not support a defect finding
pursuant to risk/benefit analysis. Similar reasoning was applied in Kitchens.
Gilbert provides an excellent example of the type of expert testimony needed
to establish plaintiff's prima facie case. Though making clear that the burden
of proof remains on plaintiff, the court limited the extent of this burden in
regard to the foreseeability element. The court rejected the defense claim that
the exact circumstances of this accident could not be foreseen. The question is
only whether the actual harm falls within the general field of danger which
should have been anticipated by the manufacturer. Plaintiff need not prove that
the exact sequence of events was foreseeable; only that the defendant, based
95 Similar issues arise in the converse situation created by recognition of the "seat belt"
defense. These issues are discussed infra Part II(G).
9667 Ohio St. 2d at 467,424 N.E.2d at 577. The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement
was subsequently abandoned in Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, n.2 at
464-5, 432 N.E.2d 814, n.2 at 817. Defective design is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2307.75
without reference to "unreasonable danger."
9 7See supra note 90.
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on the attention, perception, memory, knowledge, and intelligence of a
reasonable automobile manufacturer, should have anticipated the general
danger posed by its chosen design.
II. DEFENSES
The best defense is, of course, to establish that the product was defect free.
Of equal importance, in many cases, is evidence that a given defect was not a
proximate cause of the injury for which recovery is sought. In a real sense these
defenses simply assert that the plaintiff has failed to meet the applicable burden
of proof. In addition, defenses which can be asserted as "affirmative defenses,"
and for which the defense bears the burden of proof, are often available and
effective. The primary affirmative defenses are discussed below.98
A. The Statute of Limitations
Product liability claims are governed by the two year provision of Ohio
Revised Code section 2305.10 generally applicable to personal injury actions.
Subsequent to the effective date of the Act, which does not contain a statute of
limitations, a claim was made that suits brought pursuant to the Act should be
governed by the six year provision of Ohio Revised Code section 2305.07,
statutory causes of action. This question was resolved in favor of the two year
statute in McAuliffe v. Western States Import Co.99
Product caused diseases or effects often have long latency periods so that
symptoms do not manifest within two years of exposure. Therefore, a
discovery rule was added to Ohio Revised Code section 2305.10 which
extended the time to file an action until such time as the relationship between
product exposure and disease or effect was known or, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have been known. This statutory extension was
also judicially created so that it could apply to claims which preceded the
statutory enactment. 100 Since its initial creation the discovery rule provision
has been amended several times to broaden its scope. The Ohio Supreme Court
and lower courts have reviewed the rule on a number of occasions.101
98This article does not address defenses premised upon the Rules of Civil Procedure
such as Rule 17(A) (Real Party in Interest), Rules 18-21 (oinder), or Jurisdiction and
Service of Process such as Rule 4.3 and 4.5 (Out of State Service and Service in a Foreign
Country).
9972 Ohio St. 3d 534, 651 N.E.2d 957 (1995);followed Gates v. Precision Post Co., 74
Ohio St.3d 439,659 N.E.2d 1241 (1996). Commercial loss property damages, other than
to the product itself, if outside the contract are controlled by Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10
for personal property and Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(D) for real property. If within the
contract such claims are governed by Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.98. Sun Refining & Mktg.
Co. v. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 68 Ohio St. 3d 397, 627 N.E.2d 552 (1994).
1000'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 84, 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983).
101 See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 72 Ohio St. 3d 269, 649
N.E.2d 175 (1995) (common law rule extended to include cost of asbestos removal
without personal injury); Liddell v. SCA Servs., 70 Ohio St. 3d 6, 635 N.E.2d 1233 (1994)
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An exception to application of the personal injury statute is found in Ohio
Revised Code section 2125.02(D), which provides that all wrongful death
actions must be commenced within two years from date of death. This
provision applies to product liability claims. This is a significant exception as
the discovery rule is inapplicable to wrongful death actions. Since this two year
period conditions the right to bring suit, and contains no discovery rule, actions
for wrongful death must be brought within this time frame.102 This bar applies
even if there was no knowledge, or where the exercise of reasonable diligence
would not have revealed, that the death was caused by a defective product to
which the decedent was exposed more than two years earlier.103 Similarly, a
survival action, the claim of the deceased for personal injury prior to death,
must be brought within two years of the date of death as the last day on which
the claim could possibly accrue is the date of death.104
Once an action has been filed within the statutory period it can, in effect, be
extended by amending a timely filed complaint to designate additional
defendants or claims after the statutory period has expired. 05 There are,
however, limits to the ability to extend the statutory period in this way. The
(effects of chlorine gas); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 66 Ohio St. 3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140
(1993) (discovery rule of Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10 unconstitutional as predicated on
the possibility that one "may" have an injury and redefining the rule to be based on a
"should" have known standard); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., 89
Ohio App. 3d 846, 627 N.E.2d 1033 (1993) (cause of action accrues, for purposes of
discovery rule, when asbestos abatement procedure commenced based on knowledge
of health hazard, rather than when aware of possible danger). Cf Holmes v. Community
College, 97 Ohio App. 3d 678, 647 N.E.2d 498, 502 (1994) (suggesting that the rule is
inapplicable to injury sustained by electric shock with immediate physical injury even
though the complained of heart injury did not manifest at that time and finding that, in
any event, plaintiff should have known of the condition more than two years prior to
filing).
102The commencement period is constitutionally valid. Because the right to bring a
wrongful death action is legislatively created, the legislature has the authority to limit
the right as itbelieves appropriate. Shover v. Cordis Corp., 61 Ohio St. 3d 213,574 N.E.2d
457 (1991); Keaton v. Ribbeck, 58 Ohio St. 2d 443, 391 N.E.2d 307 (1979). See also Burris
v. Romaker, 71 Ohio App. 3d 772,595 N.E.2d 425 (1991); Taylor v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 21 Ohio App. 3d 186, 486 N.E.2d 1173 (1984).
103Walker v. Celanese Piping Sys., Nos. 86 CV-08-5233 (Ohio C.P. Franklin County
Feb. 3, 1987), affd, Nos. AP 307, 308, 1987 WL 14236 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County
July 16,1987).
104Id. See also Bazdar v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio 1981), appeal
dismissed, 705 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982).
10SRule 15(C) OHIo R. CIV. P. allows claims or defenses set forth in amended pleadings
to relate back to the date of the original proceeding. Rule 15(D) allows for the use of
"Doe" defendants who, after identification, can be designated as defendants and have
service made upon them. Provided that the specific requirements of the Rules are met,
the amended pleading will not be subject to a statute of limitation defense even where
a new defendant is designated due to mistake or misnomer at the time of filing.
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indu., Inc., 89 Ohio App. 3d 846,627 N.E.2d
1033 (1993).
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first decision holding that an amended complaint seeking only to designate
additional plaintiffs was not within the purview of Rule 15(C) appears to be
Neff v. Celanese Piping Systems.106
In addition, the savings statute allows for a one year extension of the
applicable statute of limitations (here, the personal injury statute) where a
complaint was timely filed and dismissed or otherwise resolved for reasons
within its purview.107 A similar extension is provided for in the wrongful death
act.108
B. Forseeability: Product Misuse
Whether a defect poses a foreseeable risk of harm is a pervasive question in
design defect litigation and appears in many other circumstances. The
foreseeability requirement, which existed prior to adoption of the Act, is
specifically set forth in the Act's design defect definition.109 There are no
106No. 85 CV-04-2279 (C.P. Mar. 31, 1987), affid on other grounds, No. 87 AP-383, 1987
WL 16792 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County, Sept. 8,1987). The trial court held that Rule
15 could not be used as a substitute for proceeding under the joinder provisions of Rules
19 and 20. This approach was subsequently taken in Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp.
& Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86,529 N.E.2d 449 (1988) (after a limitation period has run,
a complaint may not be amended to add a new plaintiff seeking to allege a new cause
of action).
107OHio REV. CODE § 2305.19. The statute provides, in part, that:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due
time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the com-
mencement of such action at the date of reversal or failure has expired,
the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the cause of action survives, his repre-
sentatives may commence a new action within one year after such date.
A common application of the savings statute occurs after a party has entered into a
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(A) OHIO R. CIv. P. The one year period runs
from filing of the dismissal rather than the date the dismissal is journalized. Gardner v.
Gleydura, 98 Ohio App. 3d 277,648 N.E.2d 537 (1994). At least three appellate districts
have held that a party may use the savings clause only once to invoke the additional
one year period. Hancock v. Kroger Co., 103 Ohio App. 3d 266, 659 N.E.2d 336 (1995),
and cases cited therein.
108OHIo REV. CODE § 2125.04. Mere filing of an action is insufficient to obtain the
extension of this provision. Moreover, a savings statute is not to be used as a means to
toll the statute of limitations. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp., 73 Ohio St. 3d
391, 396-7, 653 N.E.2d 235, 239-240 (1995).
109 0HIo REV. CODE § 2307.75(A)(1) and (2) provide that a product is defective in
design or formulation, if either:
1. ... the foreseeable risks associated with its design ... exceeded the
benefits...;
2. It is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably forseeable manner.
Forseeable risk is defined as a risk of harm associated with an intended or reasonably
foreseeable use, modification, or alteration of the product which should have been
recognized by the manufacturer pursuant to standards specified in the section. OHIO
REV. CODE § 2307.71(F).
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significant differences between pre-Act and post-Act opinions in their
application of the misuse defense. Strictly speaking, the burden of proof as to
foreseeability rests on plaintiff.110 From a more practical vantage point the
defendant assumes the burden of proof by seeking to establish that the defect/
injury nexus was not foreseeble as it resulted from unreasonable or
unforseeable misuse or alteration of its product.111
The Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that in a strict liability action, as
distinct from a negligence based action, the affirmative defense is that of
unforeseeable misuse.112 The absence of a foreseeable misuse absolved a
defendant manufacturer of both negligence and strict tort liability in Menifee113
where decedent's death was caused by inhalation of nitrogen and deprivation
of oxygen. The injury occurred when an air compressor was used to clean
equipment owned by decedent's employer and only the employer knew that
the system would be used not only to power air tools which provided the
cleaning agent, but also to supply air for breathing purposes. The court
reasoned that the test of foreseeability was whether a reasonably prudent
person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the
performance or nonperformance of an act and that this usually depends on the
defendant's knowledge.114 Defendants were responsible only for those risks
that they perceived or should have perceived. Even though compressors are
known to be used to supply air, on these facts none of the defendants (including
the compressor manufacturer) could foresee that a system designed to generate
power for air tools would be used to supply breathing air. "[A] manufacturer
need not anticipate all uses to which its product may be put, nor guarantee that
the product is incapable of causing injury in all of its possible uses."115
110See, e.g., Hunt v. Marksman Prods., 101 Ohio App. 3d 760, 656 N.E.2d 726 (1995),
where defendant gained summary judgment as neither the design nor manufacture of
a realistic appearing BB gun led to the actual shooting of plaintiff. The use of an actual
gun, similar in appearance to the BB gun, was neither foreseeable nor a proximate cause
of the harm.
111Alteration, which can negate the existence of a defect at time of manufacture, is
discussed supra Part I(B)(2).
112Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 61 Ohio St. 3d 470,575 N.E.2d 416 (1991).
The terms unreasonable and unforseeable are not synonyms. Id. at 476, 575 N.E.2d at
421. Compare, however, the court's earlier recognition that a product cannot be
defective in design under the Restatement unless it was used in an intended or
reasonably forseeable manner. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d
456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 576 (1981). Similarly, the term product "abuse" is frequently used
in tandem with "misuse" or as a distinct term. Ohio law consistently applies the term
"misuse" and, therefore, this article contains no analysis of the so-called "product abuse"
defense.
11315 Ohio St. 3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984).
114Despite this terminology, the reasoning is consistent with the Act's focus on the
conduct of reasonable manufacturers.
115 Menfee, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 78, 472 N.E.2d at 711 (1984).
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 403 1995
CLEVLAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Additional Decisions
Bowling v. Hel Co. 116 This decision reviews the evolution of Ohio product
liability law and reiterates that there are two affirmative defenses to strict
liability claims-voluntary and knowing assumption of the risk and
unforeseeable product misuse.
Zavodney v. Weyerhauser Co.117 The Act, despite the absence of a specific
foreseeability requirement, contains the requirement by virtue of common law
precedents and statutory interpretation so that unforseeable misuse remains
an affirmative defense.
Shannon v. Waco Scaffolding & Equipment.11 8 Where plaintiff attached a block
pulley to a scaffold tower rather than a ceiling I-beam, it was proper to instruct
the jury as to unforseeable misuse.
Phillips v. Wright Bernet, Inc.119 Unforeseeable misuse of a machine by an
industrial employer was sufficient to allow judgment as a matter of law.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Fyr-Fyter Sales & Service.120 Improper use of
insulation material is a use other than that intended for the product and,
therefore, allows judgment for defendant as a matter of law.
Feliciano v. Euclid Chemical C0.121 Affirming summary judgment where floor
sealant manufacturer could not foresee that plaintiff's employer would store
the containers improperly.
Smith v. TECO, Inc.122 The use of a "jib" bucket to shield a lineman from power
lines did not constitute an unforseeable misuse of the product.
C. Causation: Intervening and Superceding Cause
Proof of a causation link between an alleged defect and the injury for which
a plaintiff seeks recovery is a mandatory element of plaintiff's burden of proof
under decisional law and the Act.123 Nevertheless, as with the affirmative
11631 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987). The primary holdings of this decision
are that comparative principles are inapplicable to strict liability actions and that the
principles of joint and several liability have not been abolished by the Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.
1 17No. 5:92CV1738 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 1994).
118 Nos. 67406, 67604, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120 (Cuyahoga County July 27,1995).
119 No. CA93-01-010, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2882 (Butler County June 7, 1993).
12067 Ohio App. 2d 11, 425 N.E.2d 910 (1979).
121No. 57208,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2832 (Cuyahoga County July 12,1990).
122No. 91AP-1318, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3100 (Franklin County June 11, 1992).
1230Hio REV. CODE § 2307.73(2). See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 489 (1988); Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15
Ohio St. 3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984); Feldman v. Howard, 10 Ohio St. 2d 189, 226
N.E.2d 564 (1967). Lack of proximate cause was recently applied as one basis for denial
of additional workers' compensation in regard to the absence of an anti-kickback device
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defense of unforseeable misuse, the existence of a break in the chain of
causation due to an intervening or superceding cause must be established by
the defendant.1 24
To establish this defense the evidence must show that the intervening event
was unforeseeable and comports with the general requirement that "causal
connection is broken when a subsequent act, or failure to act, intervenes and
completely removes the effect of the first act... and is itself the proximate cause
of the injury."125 Moreover, the intervening act must be both new and
independent.126
The foundation for current application of intervening cause analysis was set
forth in Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 127 and Cascone v. Herb Kay Co.128 The Cascone
decision relied upon and followed the applicable aspects of the earlier decision
in Thrash. Although neither case was a product liability action, both had fact
patterns with product liability overtones. In Cascone, for example, an
automobile mechanic sought to recover, on a negligence theory, for damages
sustained when a hydraulic automobile lift suddenly lowered resulting in
injuries to his head and arm. The court reversed a grant of summary judgment
because there were fact issues as to whether repairs to the lift and its
reactivation met the requisites for intervening cause. The court recognized that
determinations as to intervening cause must be based on a two prong analysis:
1. whether, between the agency that created the original hazard
and an injury resulting from such hazard, another conscious
and responsible agency exists which should or could have
eliminated the hazard, and
2. whether the act was foreseeable.
An affirmative answer to the first prong coupled with a negative answer to the
second legally breaks the chain of causation and absolves the original actor
from liability.
These issues are further complicated by the fact that causation issues often
concern a plaintiff's own conduct. Although contributory negligence is not a
on a saw. State ex rel. Lovell v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Ohio St. 3d 250, 658 N.E.2d 284(1996).
124 The terms supervening and intervening are not synonymous though many courts
use them interchangeably or collectively. An intervening cause arises from action or
inaction which occurs betweeen the time of a negligent act or sale of a defective product
and the time of the injury producing event. This occurrence will then be asserted as the
proximate cause of harm. When the intervening event is so great as to terminate the
linkage between the initial event or defect and the harm caused, it supercedes the earlier
act and becomes the proximate cause of the harm thereby insulating the original actor
from liability.
125OHIO JURY INSTRUCTION 11.30(3) (1995) (defining superceding cause).
1261d.
127158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
1286 Ohio St. 3d 156, 451 N.E.2d 815 (1983).
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defense to a product liability claim, the plaintiff's own conduct-which might
otherwise be categorized as contributory negligence--can break the chain of
causation. The nexus between the effect of conduct which could constitute both
contributory negligence and intervening cause has been raised in a number of
cases.
129
Additional Decisions
Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc.130 The determination of whether
an intervening act is sufficiently independent to break the chain of causation
is a question of fact. Here, the negligent over-torquing of bolts during assembly
of a grain bin, which led to the collapse of the bin, would be an intervening
cause provided that the assembler was not an agent of the manufacturer.131
Leibreich v. A. J. Refrigeration, Inc.132 The installer of a truck refrigeration unit
was not entitled to summary judgment based on intervening cause due to a
fact question as to whether the installer could foresee that drivers would leave
the engine running. Absent a finding that the alleged intervening act was
unforeseeable, the defense is not established. If foreseeble, the intervening act
is a consequence of the original act and, therefore, within the causation chain.
R. H. Macy & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.133 Intervening cause is available as a
defense in product liability actions. The defense can be invoked to avoid
liability where the intervening cause is unforeseeable and the proximate cause
of the injury. This is allowed despite the fact that the occurrence may have been
due to defendant's own negligence. A jury instruction on intervening cause
was appropriate and did not amount to a charge which would allow the jury
to compare the negligence of the parties.
The decision affirms Ohio Jury Instruction 11.30(3) which requires that a
superceding cause exists only where the intervening act is new and
independent. 'The term 'independent' means the absence of any connection or
relationship ... between the original and subsequent act... The term 'new'
means that the second act of negligence could not reasonably have been foreseen."134
12 9Clark v. Snapper Power Equip. Co., No. 93 CA 9, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5548
(Miami County Nov. 18,1993) (plaintiff's own actions can constitute intervening cause);
Cf. Hardiman v. ZEP Mfg. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 222, 470 N.E.2d 941 (1984) (intervening
cause generally contemplates actions of a third party and to permit a jury charge on
intervening cause based on plaintiff's own conduct is an improper equivalent of
contributory negligence).
130728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984).
13 1The opinion makes clear that the facts fully supported a finding of intervening
cause, but reversed judgment for the manufacturer on the grounds that the district court
did not set forth adequate fact findings in regard to the agency issue.
13267 Ohio St. 3d 266, 617 N.E.2d 1068 (1993).
13351 Ohio St. 3d 108, 554 N.E.2d 1313 (1990).
1341d. at 111, 554 N.E.2d at 1317.
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Bruns v. Cooper Industries, Inc.135 Plaintiff, while working as a construction
mechanic, was injured when struck by a fragment of a steel hammer head
which broke off during use. A warning incorporated onto the handle of the
hammer had worn off. The employer's act of providing plaintiff with the
warningless hammer was unforeseeable and a superceding cause sufficient to
support the granting of summary judgment.
D. Failure to Warn Claims (Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(B))
and Related Defenses
Although failure to warn cases are easily pled and usually reach the jury,
there are defenses to such claims. These defenses are varied, exist at both the
common law and by statute, and are represented in a wide body of decisional
law. In Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co. 136 The court adopted the rule that if a
warning is given, the seller can reasonably assume that it will be read and
obeyed. If that warning or instruction is adequate, this assumption can result
in judgment for the defense. This defense is difficult to establish as a matter of
law.137 The complete defense set forth in Temple, 138 which held that no
negligence based failure to warn claim existed as a matter of law where the
product complied with an applicable safety regulation (which covered the
alleged defect), is no longer viable. First, the defense was limited to negligence
actions and had no bearing on a strict liability failure to warn claim. Second,
the defense is not carried forward in Ohio Revised Code section 2307.76.
Additional Decisions
Ditto v. Monsanto Co. 139 Chemical manufacturer had no duty to warn
employees of industrial user of chemicals pursuant to the sophisticated
purchaser doctrine of Adams v. Union Carbide Corp.140
13578 Ohio App. 3d 428, 605 N.E.2d 395 (1992). See also Clark v. Snapper, No. 93 CA
9,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5548 (Miami County Nov. 18,1993); Chaplynski v. Van Holle,
No. CA91-08-060, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1929 (Clermont County Apr. 13, 1992).
13652 Ohio St. 3d 251, 556 N.E.2d 1177 (1990).
13 7See, e.g., Hardiman v. ZEP Mfg. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 222, 470 N.E.2d 941 (1984)
(plaintiff recovered despite admitting that he did not read the warning). But see Sproles
v. Simpson Fence Co., 99 Ohio App. 3d 72, 649 N.E.2d 1297 (1994) (a warning and
plaintiff's knowledge combined to support summary judgment due to assumption of
the risk as a matter of law).
13850 Ohio St.2d 317,364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
13936 F.3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1994).
140737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). But see Steinke v. Koch
Fuels, Inc., 78 Ohio App. 3d 791, 605 N.E.2d 1341 (1992) (a bulk supplier of hazardous
material had a duty to warn the ultimate user of the product's danger regardless of the
employer's knowledge).
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Phan v. Presrite Corp.141 Summary judgment for a manufacturer was proper
where there was an adequate warning on the foot switch of a power press and
the employer knew of available safety devices.
Carrel v. Allied Products Corp.142 Plaintiff's knowledge of danger, based upon
twenty years of experience, negated any need to warn.
Hanlon v. Lane.143 Danger of carbon monoxide poisoning from an improperly
vented gas furnace is an open and obvious danger.
Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co.144 Dangers of alcoholic beverages are a matter
of common knowledge (rejecting a "nullification" claim based on advertising).
Consumers of Ohio v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.145 Risks posed by
smoking are within scope of knowledge of ordinary consumer.
E. Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Assumption of the Risk:
The Traditional Conduct Based Defenses
These related yet distinct concepts are treated together for convenience. 146
Comparative negligence, as set forth in Ohio Revised Code section 2315.19,
is inapplicable to a product liability claim brought pursuant to the Act.147
Contributory negligence is not an affirmative defense to product liability
141100 Ohio App. 3d 195, 653 N.E.2d 708 (1994).
142 No. 9-94-24, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091 (Marion County July 11, 1995).
14398 Ohio App. 3d 148, 648 N.E.2d 26 (1994).
14496 Ohio App. 3d 160,644 N.E.2d 731 (1994). See also Desatnik v. Lem Motlow Prop.
Inc., No. 84 CA 104,1986 WL 760 (Ohio Ct. App. Mahoning County Jan. 9, 1986).
14552 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp.
228 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Similar conclusions have been reached in a variety of contexts.
See, e.g., Shaffer v. AMF, Inc., 842 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1988) (motorcycle riding); Briney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986) (saw blade, assumption of risk);
Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co., 65 Ohio App. 3d 1,582 N.E.2d 1000 (1989) (BB gun); and
Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 36 Ohio App. 3d 62, 520 N.E.2d 1375 (1987) (truck
engine sparking).
146 For purposes of Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.19 (Comparative negligence), the defenses
of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence have been merged. Anderson v.
Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983). Except as to suppliers, this merger
has no bearing on product liability actions. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.20.
147This creates a difficult situation where a plaintiff has brought suit against both a
negligent individual or business entity defendant and a product liability defendant.
Unlike most states, the Ohio courts have not adopted a common law form of
comparative fault to supplement the statute. In such cases it is likely that the product
liability defendant will be deemed liable for the entire injury without regard to the
contribution to harm of the negligent co-defendant. Moreover, although the negligent
defendant could be jointly and severally liable only for economic damages pursuant to
OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.19(D), the product liability defendant may well be jointly and
severally liable for the entire judgment. The theoretical protection afforded to the
product liability defendant pursuant to the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,
OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.31 and 2307.32, could provide little practical benefit. No Ohio
decision appears to address these questions.
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claims. 148 Conduct which evidences mere negligence on the part of a plaintiff
is irrelevant under both the case law and the Act.149 Comparative negligence,
however, is applicable to negligence based claims against product suppliers as
provided in Ohio Revised Code section 2307.78.150 Ohio does not recognize a
common law comparative fault approach to supplement the statute.151
Assumption of the risk is available as an affirmative defense to a product
liability action. See Ohio Revised Code section 2315.20(B). Express or implied
assumption, where the risk assumed was the proximate cause of harm, is a
complete bar to any claim.
Additional Decisions
1. Comparative Negligence
a. Common Law Negligence Based Actions
Both state and federal courts applied comparative negligence to common
law product liability design defect claims which sounded in negligence.152 As
such a claim cannot be brought pursuant to the Act, these decisions are
applicable only to actions filed prior to January 5, 1988.
b. Strict Liability and Product Liability Act Claims
Crislip v. Twentieth Century Heating & Ventilating Co.153 Comparative
negligence is not available as a defense to a strict liability failure to warn claim.
Bowling v. Hel Co.154 As comparative negligence is predicated on "fault"
concepts, it has no application to claims sounding in strict liability.
c. Jury Verdict - Procedural Aspects
O'Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. 155 In a case tried under comparative
negligence principles, three-fourths of the jury must agree as to both negligence
1 4 8 OHIo REV. CODE § 2315.20(C)(1).
149This approach is consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (SECOND) 402A
cmt. n (1965).
150OHIO REV. CODE § 2315(C)(2).
151This despite the court's obvious power to do so as illustrated by the fact that, in
order to give the statute retroactive effect, the court created common law comparative
negligence in a form identical to that of the statute. Wilfong v. Batdorf, 6 Ohio St. 3d 100,
451 N.E.2d 1185 (1983).
152 See Briney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986); Onderko v.
Richmond Mfg. Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
15352 Ohio St.3d 251, 556 N.E.2d 1177 (1990).
15431 Ohio St.3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987). Accord Onderko. See also Eberly v. A.P.
Controls, Inc., 61 Ohio St. 3d 27,572 N.E.2d 633 (1991).
15558 Ohio St. 3d 226, 569 N.E.2d 889 (1991).
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and causation. Only those jurors who so find may participate in the
apportionment of comparative negligence.
2. Assumption of the Risk
Except as specified below, assumption of the risk is a complete defense
precluding all recovery.
a. Generally
Carrel v. Allied Products Corp.156 Assumption of the risk was recognized as a
complete defense as a matter of law where plaintiff placed his hand in a die
space without utilizing an available safety device. That an unexpected act of a
co-worker activated the press was irrelevant.
Benjamin v. Deffet Rentals, Inc.157 Plaintiff assumed the risk of slipping on a
wet diving board.158
b. In the Workplace
Courts have drawn distinctions between cases sounding in product liability
outside the workplace and claims arising from workplace related injuries. It is
more difficult to assert the defense for workplace injuries as the plaintiff is in
a position to argue that his or her assumption was mandated by the job and
that it was, therefore, not a voluntary assumption. This approach is consistent
with cases throughout the United States as exemplified by the well known
decision in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.159
Freas v. Prater Construction Corp., Inc.160 Violation of proper warnings as to
crane disassembly was assumption of the risk. Onderko recognizes assumption
of risk, express or implied, as a full defense, but arguably requires that the
assumption be unreasonable.
Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Manufacturing Co. 161 This case illustrates the
distinction between workplace related assumption and assumption in other
156No. 9-94-24, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091 (Marion County July 11, 1995).
15766 Ohio St. 2d 86, 419 N.E.2d 883 (1981).
158There are a plethora of assumption cases in both the state and federal courts. See,
e.g., Parr v. Clark Equip. Co., 844 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1988); Briney v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 782 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986); Sedgwick v. Kawasaki Cycleworks, Inc., 71 Ohio App.
3d 117,593 N.E.2d 69 (1991); Meador v. Wagner-Smith, No. 11886,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
2179 (Montgomery County June 1, 1990).
159386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978).
16060 Ohio St. 3d 6,573 N.E.2d 27 (1991).
16157 Ohio St. 3d 145,566 N.E.2d 1203 (1991). This holding is consistent with Freas in
that plaintiff in Freas could have acted safely consistent with his job duties. See also
Evanoff v. Grove Mfg. Co., 99 Ohio App. 3d 339, 650 N.E.2d 914 (1994) (summaryjudgment improper due to a material fact issue as to whether the injured employee had
other options in positioning a crane).
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contexts noting that an employee does not assume the risk of injury which
occurs in the course of employment where that risk must be encountered as
part of job duties.
Whiston v. Bio-Lab, Inc.162 A jury instruction on assumption, consistent with
Ohio Revised Code section 2315.20, for injuries sustained at the workplace was
permitted. The court distinguished Cremeans on the grounds that it preceded
statute enactment.163
Kukay v. Crown Controls Corp.,164and Sigman v. General Electric Co.165 These
decisions hold that there is no assumption due to lack of voluntary action where
the injured party encountered risk due to job duties.
c. Suppliers (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.78)
As product liability claims against suppliers rest in negligence, the
comparative negligence statute applies. Consistent with the statute166 and case
law,16 7 assumption is not a complete defense but will be weighed as a cause of
harm factor. If plaintiff's contribution to harm exceeds the combined
negligence of all others against whom recovery is sought, the defense will
become a complete bar.168
d. Parent/child
Parents cannot assume the risk on behalf of infant children. As a norm, one
cannot encounter or accept a risk on behalf of another. This principle is all the
more important where a child is injured due to the action of a parent. Both a
crib manufacturer and a car seat manufacturer were unable to assert assump-
16285 Ohio App. 3d 300,619 N.E.2d 1047 (1993).
163 See also Syler v. Signode Corp., 76 Ohio App. 3d 250,601 N.E.2d 225 (1992) (seeking
to reconcile various opinions and approaches); Knueven v. Deere & Co., No. 12-94-7,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1597 (Putnam County Apr. 13, 1995) (Cremeans approach is
inapplicable to a self-employed farmer).
164No. S-90-7, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5178 (Sandusky County Oct. 25, 1991).
16577 Ohio App. 3d 430, 602 N.E.2d 711 (1991).
166OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.78 addresses the liability of a supplier as defined in OHIO
REV. CODE § 2307.71(0). Suppliers can be liable for harm caused by their own negligence
or failure to conform to their own representations. Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.78(A);
Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d 40,537 N.E.2d
624 (1989). If the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.78(B) exist a supplier will be
treated as though it were the manufacturer of the product.
167Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983). Similarly,
assumption of the risk can become a complete bar. See Sproles v. Simpson Fence Co., 99
Ohio App. 3d 72,649 N.E.2d 1297 (1994) (assumption outweighed any negligence of an
electric fence installer to a degree permitting summary judgment).
168 See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2315.19 and 2315.20(B).
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tion of the risk for harm to a child despite parental knowledge of the danger
posed by the products. 169
F State of the Art/Safety History
Indeed, in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling na' have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.
1
This doctrine has two key practical aspects: If the product is state of the art,
and meets other requirements, it is not defective. If the product is not state of
the art, a defect finding is close to inevitable. Compliance with state of the art
norms is a complete defense. Ohio Revised Code section 2307.75(F) declares
that a product is not defective in design or formulation where the following
conditions are met.
1. At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, a
practical and technically feasible alternative design, which
would have prevented the harm complained of, was not
available; without
2. substantially impairing the usefulness or intended purpose of
the product; unless
3. the manufacturer acted unreasonably in introducing the
product into trade or commerce.
171
This statutory approach eliminates the hindsight test. The controlling
reference point, the time that the product left its manufacturer's control,
precludes any claim that a product should be judged by standards applicable
at or after the time of injury. The statute also appears to resolve the conflict
between the two primary definitions of "state of the art." It reflects the view
that a product conforms to state of the art if it includes all safety features
available at the time of distribution which have proven themselves in the
market place as cost effective. The statute implicitly rejects the view that
requires a product to include all safety features that were available by the
imaginative use of cutting edge technology.
Compliance with government or industry standards, which relates to state
of the art, deserves brief mention. As a norm, evidence of compliance with
applicable government or industry standards will be some evidence of
non-defect, while non-compliance will be strong evidence of defect with a
highly persuasive jury effect. 172
169Avila v. Questor Juvenile Furniture Co., 74 Ohio App. 3d 597,599 N.E.2d 771 (1991)
(car seat); Mulloy v. Longaberger, 47 Ohio App.3d 77,547 N.E.2d 411 (1989) (cradle).
170The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932) (L. Hand, J.
describing custom, but equally applicable to state of the art).
1 71No Ohio decisions appear to address this principle. Fireworks, some toys, and
other products with low utility and high risk are potentially subject to this rule.
1 72 See Minichello v. U.S. Indus. Inc., 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985) and Behanan v. Desco
Distrib. Co., 98 Ohio App. 3d 23, 647 N.E.2d 830 (1994) (OHSA standards not admissible
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Although distinct from state of the art evidence, evidence that a product has
not previously caused harm, or has an exemplary safety history, bears on
similar concerns. Introduction of such evidence is the converse of a plaintiff's
effort to introduce facts of prior injuries caused by the defect which allegedly
caused harm in the subject case. 173 There appears to be no clear Ohio law as to
the extent to which prior safety history evidence can be used to refute claims
of design defect.
Additional Decisions
1. State of the Art
Jacobs v. E.L Dupont De Nenours & Co. 174 The manufacturer of flourinated
ethylene propylene film and polytetrafluorethylene, used by another company
to manufacture an allegedly defective jaw implant, was exempt from liability
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 2307.75(F). The exemption applied as
there was no evidence of an alternative design that would have avoided the
injuries sustained by plaintiff.
Layne v. GAF Corp.175 On motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict after
a verdict in favor of plaihiff who claimed asbestos related mesothelioma, the
court reviewed several aspects of Ohio product liability law. It found that by
on various questions of liability due to specific language of statute); Sours v. General
Motors Corp., 717F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983) (compliancewith FMVSS is a non-conclusive
guide); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 857 (1982) (statutory regulation as guide to reasonableness of design); Minichello
& Smith v. Raymond Corp., No. 57670,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4622 (Cuyahoga County
Oct. 25,1990) (evidenceof ANSI standards admissible); Whiston v. Bio-Lab, Inc., 85 Ohio
App. 3d 300,619 N.E.2d 1047 (1993) (violation of FIFRA label standards not conclusive).
173 See, e.g., Renfro v. Black, 52 Ohio St. 3d 27, 556 N.E.2d 150 (1990), and cases cited
therein. Evidence of similar claims or accidents is not relevant to a strict liability claim.
Mulloy v. Longaberger, Inc., 47 Ohio App. 3d 77, 547 N.E.2d 411 (1989) (prior injuries
due to inhalation of aromatic hydrocarbons in a paint stain) relying on Onderko v.
Richmond Mfg. Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 296,511 N.E.2d 388 (1987). The discussion in Onderko
may be more limited than the total prohibition indicated in Mulloy dependent upon the
degree to which the second sentence quoted below qualifies the first:
Evidence of prior similar accidents, offered to show that a defendant
knew or should have known of a product's dangerous propensities,
is relevant only to negligence. Such evidence has no bearing in a claim
based on strict liability where its purpose, .. is to show knowledge
or notice of prior accidents.
Onderko at 301, 511 N.E.2d at 392. Cf. Felden v. Ashland Chem. Co., 91 Ohio App. 3d
48, 631 N.E.2d 689 (1993) (application of Rule of Evidence 407 in an employee's
intentional tort action; permitting evidence of prior occurrences as relevant to question
of employer knowledge).
17467 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
17542 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 537 N.E.2d 252 (C.P. 1988). Cf. Eldridge v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 24 Ohio App. 3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293 (1985) (absence of a trailing guard on
a lawn mower raised a question of excessive preventable harm rather than state of the
art).
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commingling Comments j and k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402(A), a manufacturer is entitled to assert a state of the art defense. The jury
charge defined the concept as:
... a manufacturer need not instruct or warn of its product [defect]
unless and until the state of medical, scientific and technical research
and knowledge has reached a level of development that would make
a reasonably prudent manufacturer aware of the unreasonable risks of
harm in the exposure to the persons who would foreseeably be
exposed to that product, and aware of the necessity to instruct or warn
those individuals against such risks of harm.
1 7 6
Sabel v. Newbury Industries Inc.177 Evidence of state of the art is properly
admissible to contest the feasibility of an alternative design. Refusal to instruct
the jury that state of the art is not a defense was not error.
2. Safety Record
The limited available law indicates that safety record evidence is admissible
to impeach testimony asserting the presence of a defect and to establish that a
manufacturer lacked prior notice of the defect. The law is ambiguous as to
whether such data can be used as evidence of non-defect.
Drake v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.178 The court neither approves nor disapproves
of a rule regarding the proper scope of testimony concerning a product's safety
record. Defense evidence of a tractor's safety record was admitted for
impeachment purposes, but not for proof of defect. Counsel's closing argument
improperly cast the evidence as proof of non-defect. A concurring opinion
argued that prior safety history (including prior accidents or their absence)
should be admissible if there is sufficient similarity.
Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc.179 The court recognized that there is good
authority both permitting and rejecting evidence of the non-occurrence of past
accidents. Without specifically approving a rule admitting such evidence, the
court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
evidence of the non-occurrence of past accidents. The court relied on Koloda v.
Gen. Motors Parts Div.180 which noted that the modern trend is to admit safety
performance evidence and ruled that such evidence was admissible to show
lack of notice of a defect.
176Layne, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d at 25, 537 N.E.2d at 258. See also Steinfurth v. Armstrong
World Indus., 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 21,500 N.E.2d 409 (C.P. 1986) (defining state of the art).
177No. 10-197, 1985 WL 4935 (Ohio Ct. App. Lake County Dec. 31,1985).
17815 Ohio St. 3d 346, 474 N.E.2d 291 (1984).
179756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985).
180716 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1983).
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G. The Seat Belt Defense
In a crashworthiness case a manufacturer is permitted to assert that some or
all of the injuries sustained would have been averted had the injured party
worn an available seat belt. This defense can be utilized to mitigate damages
or, in appropriate cases, as a full defense.181 In such cases the burden of proof
appears to be upon the defense.182
The Tenth District Court of Appeals recently cited approvingly a law
review article which posited that before the seat belt defense could be
submitted to the jury, factual evidence would be required to support
that either the injuries sustained would have been lessened or that the
accident would not have occurred had the plaintiff been wearing a seat
belt.18
3
This defense is currently limited to crashworthiness actions and will not be
judicially extended to other civil actions.184
H. The Government Contractor Defense
Although based on federal law, this defense to design defect litigation (as
distinct from manufacturing flaws) can come to bear on actions brought under
state law. This is made clear in the leading case of Boyle v. United Technologies,
Corp.185 which involved an action brought under Virginia law for the death of
a United States Marine allegedly due to defects in a helicopter's escape-hatch
system. Despite the absence of federal preemptive legislation, the unique
federal interest in civil liability arising out of federal procurement contracts,
even in actions between private litigants, was sufficient to mandate application
of federal law to the exclusion of state law.
Modifying prior law as set forth in Feres v. United States,186 the Court
redefined the Government Contractor Defense to preclude state law liability
for design defects in military equipment, when:
1. The United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
2. The equipment conformed to those specifications; and, when
applicable,
181OHIo REV. CODE § 4513.263(F)(2).
182See Bantel v. Herbert, 31 Ohio App. 3d 167,509 N.E.2d 981 (1987).
1831d. at 168-69, 509 N.E.2d at 982-3, citing Woods v. Columbus, 23 Ohio App. 3d 163,
167,492 N.E.2d 466,470, relying on Stephen J. Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to
Seat Belt Issues, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217, 246 (1980). The cited article also discusses the
dynamics and kinematics of automobile collisions in relation to crashworthiness actions
discussed supra Part I(F).
184 See Vogel v. Wells, 57 Ohio St. 3d 91, 566 N.E.2d 154 (1991).
185487 U.S. 500 (1988).
186340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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3. The supplier warned the United States about dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not
to the United States.18
7
III. DAMAGES (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.72 and related sections)
Compensatory damages available to claimants in a product liability action
pursuant to the Act are largely consistent with traditional and well recognized
measures of compensation. 188 There are no significant differences between
product liability plaintiffs and other tort plaintiffs in regard to such areas as
pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, past and future loss of
earnings, or loss of society and consortium. 18 9
Claims for hedonistic damages, loss of the ability to enjoy or perform usual
functions and activities or to participate in the amenities of life (loss of life's
enjoyment), are a relatively recent development in tort law. They are
compensable under Ohio law. In Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prod. Co.,190 a
negligence action, the plaintiff sought such damages, together with pain and
suffering, for injuries received when a warped section of a metal concrete chute
fell on him. The jury awarded specific sums for both the pain and suffering and
the loss of life's enjoyment. In the erroneous belief that an earlier decision1 91
limited loss of life's enjoyment damages to claims predicated on emotional
18 7Boyle, 487 U.S. at 499. This definition of the defense was applied, and summaryjudgment granted, as to claims of both military and civilian personnel in In re AirCraft
Crash Litig. Frederick, Md., 752 F.Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990), affd sub nom, Darling v.
Boeing Co., 935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991).
188 See OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.72 which describes the types of damages available in
product liability claims. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.72(D)(1) states that the Act does not
supercede, modify, or otherwise affect laws addressing harm which arises from
"contamination or pollution of the environment, including... a threat of contamination
or pollution from hazardous or toxic substances." "Environment" is defined in OHIO REV.
CODE § 2307.71(C); "Hazardous or toxic substances" is defined in OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2307.71(H).
OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.73 provides for the award of compensatory damages where
a defective product proximately causes harm. "Harm" is defined in OHIO REV. CODE§ 2307.71(G) to include death, physical injury to the person, serious emotional distress,
or physical damage to property other than the product itself. This definition expressly
excludes economic loss.
189No further discussion of these traditional sources of compensatory damages will
be provided. The statutory modification of the collateral benefits rule contained in Ohio
Rev. Code § 2317.45, which applied to all torts including product liability claims, was
held unconstitutional in Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St. 3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994).
Ohio adheres to the traditional common law collateral benefits rule. But see Buchman v.
Board of Educ., 73 Ohio St. 3d 260,652 N.E.2d 952 (1995) (political subdivisions statutory
exception upheld).
19064 Ohio St.3d 601, 597 N.E.2d 474 (1992).
191 Binns v. Fredendall, 32 Ohio St. 3d 244, 513 N.E.2d 278 (1987).
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distress arising contemporaneously with physical injury, the court of appeals
reversed the award of enjoyment damages.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that this form of damages is available,
observing that Ohio Jury Instruction number 23.01 provides that in
determining the amount of damages to be awarded, the jury is to consider "the
ability or inability to perform usual activities." Though it was error to charge
the jury that it could award damages for "loss of enjoyment of life" as distinct
from "inability to perform usual activities," this was not prejudicial error. The
applicable law, and its limits, are set forth in Syllabus 2 of the decision:
Where an individual suffers personal injuries, the question of damages
for "loss of ability to perform the plaintiff's usual functions" may, when
evidence thereon has been adduced, be submitted to the jury, and set
forth in a special interrogatory and separate finding of damages,
provided, however, that the court instructs the jury that if it awards
such damages, it shall not award additional damages for that same loss
when considering any other element of damages, such as physical and
mental pain and suffering.
192
The opinion is written with sufficient breadth as to make clear that this element
of damages will be available to those entitled to compensation in product
liability claims.
Laws relating to the areas of economic loss, compensation for emotional
distress, and punitive damages are contained in the Act and are, therefore,
discussed below.
A. Economic Loss (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.79)
If a plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages, that plaintiff may
also recover for economic loss proximately caused by the product defect.
193
This loss can include damage to the product itself. 194 The Act's definitions for
recovery of "harm" and for recovery of loss of bargain or "economic loss" are
distinct. Absent a compensatory award for harm, there can be no recovery for
economic loss.195
Although the Act does not distinguish between direct and indirect economic
loss, the distinction is recognized in negligence actions between commercial
entities as comprehensively discussed in Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. General
192Fantozzi, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 601-02, 597 N.E.2d at 476.
193 OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.79(A).
194OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.71(B).
195The parallel, of course, is to the traditional rule applicable to the award of punitive
damages, carried forward in the Act, that such damages are available only when
compensatory damages have been awarded. There need be no correlation between the
amount of compensatory damages and the amount of economic loss damages. An
award of low compensatory damages and high economic loss damages is valid.
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American Transportation Corp.196 Direct economic losses are those attributable
to the decreased value of the product (the difference between the actual value
of the defective product and its value if not defective). Indirect economic losses
are consequential damages such as the lost value of production time and loss
of profit.197 Indirect economic damages can be recovered in a negligence action
where the damages are caused by tangible, physical injury to persons or from
property damage where there is direct causal nexus between the tangible
damage and the indirect economic losses. This relationship need not exist for
recovery of direct economic damages which, by definition, arise from property
damage. The extent to which such distinctions will apply in product liability
claims remains unclear. It is, however, likely that analogs will be drawn. 198
Additional Decisions
LaPuma v. Collinwood Concrete.199 Due to the absence of other independent
damage, allegations of economic loss for property and repair damages
resulting from the need to replace driveway concrete failed to state a claim for
harm under Ohio Revised Code sections 2307.71(B) and 2307.79.200
Buck v. Sportcoach Div. of Coachman Indus., Inc.20 1 Defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff's claims for costs incurred for repairs,
decrease in value, towing, lodging, and similar expenses allegedly caused by
19673 Ohio St. 3d 609, 653 N.E.2d 661 (1995).
197Comparison to similar damages for breach of warranty claims and consequential
and incidental damages pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code provide a useful
analogy. See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1302.88 and 1302.89; Brant v. Wilkinson Printing Co.,
No. 15-93-1,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3613 (Van Wert County July 14,1993); Shiffer Indus.
Inc. v. Lakewood Tool & Supply Co., No. 62744,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2927 (Cuyahoga
County June 10, 1993) (breach of warranty as an alternative remedy to a strict liability
claim and recognizing that strict liability is available when commercial parties are not
in privity per Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d
40,537 N.E.2d 624 (1989)).
198 The body of law addressing economic loss claims predicated on negligence also
provides guidance as to how these provisions of the Act will be applied. See, e.g.,
Chemtrol, 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624 (economic loss, alone, is not a cognizable
claim; economic loss includes decreased value of the product itself, consequential losses,
and damage to the product); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209
N.E.2d 583 (1965) (privity requirement in a productbased negligence action);Floor Craft
Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Ohio St. 3d 1,560 N.E.2d
206 (1990) (privity requirement); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88,
326 N.E.2d 267 (1975) (allowing recovery of"property damage" in a tort action for breach
of implied warranty without privity). Note, however, that contrary to the mandate of
several pre-Act cases that parties to economic loss claims stand in privity of contract,
there is no privity requirement for claims brought pursuant to the Act.
19975 Ohio St.3d 64, 661 N.E.2d 714 (1996).
200 plaintiff's claim was not, however, preempted by the statute. The case was
remanded for further proceedings based on a common law claim of implied warranty.
20 1No. 14858, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2859 (Summit County June 25, 1991).
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defects in a recreational vehicle as these were economic losses under Ohio
Revised Code section 2307.71(B).
B. Emotional Distress
Claims for emotional distress have been the subject of considerable Ohio
Supreme Court jurisprudence. A product liability claim is defined as a civil
action seeking recovery from a manufacturer or supplier for specific
compensatory damages which include "emotional distress."202 The term,
qualified by the word "serious," is also found within the Act's definition of
"harm.'203 As the Act provides no further elucidation on the meaning and
application of law to facts for emotional distress claims, existing decisional law
will be decisive regardless of whether it is predicated on tort claims or product
liability claims. These decisions, coupled with standard rules of statutory
interpretation, make manifest that compensatory damages of this type are
available in product liability actions only where there is "serious" emotional
distress.
Recognition of modem concepts of emotional distress claims began with
three 1983 decisions. 204 Together, these decisions stand for the rules that (1) one
who through extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes serious emotional distress is subject to liability;205 and (2) a claim for
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress may be stated without
manifestation of physical injury i.e., without contemporaneous physical
injury.206 The claim may be made by a bystander provided that injury to the
third party is both serious and reasonably foreseeable.207 To come within the
purview of "serious" emotional distress, the injury must be severe and
debilitating-such that a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental distress created by the
circumstances.208 This requirement is limited to cases in which there is no
contemporaneous physical injury. Where physical injury is present, a lessened
202OHio REV. CODE § 2307.71(M).
203OH0 REV. CODE § 2307.71(G).
2 04 Yeager v. Local Union 20,6 Ohio St. 3d 369,453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); Paugh v. Hanks,
6 Ohio St. 3d 72,451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131,
447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
205Yeager, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 374, 453 N.E.2d at 671.
2 06paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 77,451 N.E.2d at 765; Schultz, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 135-136, 447
N.E.2d at 113, Syllabus. See also Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 64 Ohio St. 3d
601, 615, 597 N.E.2d 474, 485 (1992).
2 07 Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d, 451 N.E.2d at 765. See also Smith v. Kings Entertainment Co.,
99 Ohio App. 3d 1,649 N.E.2d 1252 (1994) (relationship between plaintiff bystander and
her friend, who was electrocuted, insufficient to allow a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
208Paugh, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 78, 451 N.E.2d at 765.
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degree of distress is actionable.209 These decisions are consistent with the
theories of non-fault based product liability claims. They are also consistent
with the Act's demand that compensable harm be limited to "serious emotional
distress."
Additional Decisions
Heiner v. Moretuzzo.2 10 In this negligence and medical malpractice action,
plaintiff was denied recovery for negligent infliction of serious emotional
distress caused by fear of a nonexistent physical peril. The claim was predicated
on plaintiff's reaction to being erroneously advised that her blood test for the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HI), which causes Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), was positive. The court accepted the legitimacy
of plaintiff's suffering as real and debilitating. Nevertheless, "the facts of this
case remind us that not every wrong is deserving of a legal remedy."21
Seimon v. Becton Dickinson & Co.2 12 A nurse, pricked by an allegedly
contaminated needle, sought recovery for emotional distress based on her fear
that she would contract HI. The court held that she failed to state a viable
claim as there was no evidence of actual exposure to the HIV virus. The focus
of the opinion is on the causation element in that there was no evidence that
the needle was the proximate cause of her emotional distress.
Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.213 A plaintiff suffering from
asbestosis may recover for increased fear of cancer if aware of the statistical
data supporting such a potential and if suffering from resultant mental distress.
Due to the absence of disease manifestation, no recovery for an increased risk
of cancer was permitted.
C. Punitive Damages (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.80)
Punitive or exemplary damages can be imposed upon manufacturers or
suppliers in personal injury product liability claim actions provided that
there is a judgment for compensatory damages. 214 Such damages may not
be awarded in wrongful death actions, including those based upon product
209 Binns v. Fredendall, 32 Ohio St. 3d 244, 245-246, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 (1987).
21073 Ohio St. 3d 80, 652 N.E.2d 664 (1995) (construing and distinguishing Schultz
and Paugh).
2 111d. at 88,652 N.E.2d at 670.
21291 Ohio App. 3d 323,632 N.E.2d 603 (1993).
21330 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E.2d 476 (C.P. 1987).
214Note, however, that when a course of events is governed by a single animus,
regardless of the number of tort theories upon which liability is predicated, there can
be only a single punitive damages award. Digital & Analog Design Corp. v. North
Supply Co., 44 Ohio St. 3d 36, 540 N.E.2d 1358 (1989).
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liability claims. 215 The ongoing debate as to the propriety of punitive damages,
particularly in product liability actions, has led to various reform legislation
which limits such damages. The imposition of virtually unlimited punitive
damages awards has also engendered constitutional concerns.216
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.80 has drastically changed the common law
rules regarding imposition of punitive damages by redefining the conduct
required for their imposition, demanding proof of such conduct by clear and
convincing evidence,2 17 and having the court determine the amount of such
damages based on a non-exclusive list of seven factors. 218 The court engages
in this process only after a jury finding of punitive damages liability.219 The
fact that a product is defective does not establish the "flagrant disregard"220
now required in lieu of less stringent common law requirements. The Act also
prohibits the imposition of punitive damages upon drug manufacturers who,
in the absence of fraud or violation of regulation, manufacture and sell their
products in accord with the requirements of the Food and Drug
Administration.221
215Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978). Subsequent
amendments to Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.21 have retained the prohibition againstpunitive
damages in wrongful death actions.
2 16 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), is the first Supreme Court
decision to hold that an award of punitive damages was grossly excessive in violation
of the due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision rejected the
imposition, after remittitur, of two million dollars in punitive damages (under Alabama
law) based on the improper painting of 1,000 vehicles when a maximum of 14 (fourteen)
were sold in the state. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (denial of
adequate review procedures as to the amount of punitive damages awards violates
procedural due process); TXO Prods. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Group, 509 U.S. 443
(1993) (grossly excessive awards can violate due process, but an award over 500 times
the amount of compensatory damages was upheld); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991) (reasonableness, rather than a mathematical bright line, guides the
determination of whether an award is so great as to violate due process);
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (punitive damages awards do not implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
2 17OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.80(A) provides that to recover punitive damages the
claimant must establish "by clear and convincing evidence, that harm for which he is
entitled to recover compensatory damages ... was the result of misconduct... that
manifested a flagrant disregard of the safety of persons who might be harmed by the
product in question."
2 18OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.80(B) requires consideration of (1) the likelihood of serious
harm; (2) awareness of that likelihood; (3) profitability of the misconduct; (4) the
duration or concealment of the misconduct; (5) conduct following discovery of the
misconduct; (6) defendant's financial condition; and (7) prior or likely future awards
imposed on the defendant.
2 19OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.80(B).
2 20OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.80(A).
221OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.80(C).
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The constitutional validity of the provision calling for the court, rather than
the jury, to ascertain the amount of damages is highly suspect. A similar tort
provision, contained in Ohio Revised Code section 2315.21(C)(2), has been
deemed a violation of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Section 5, Article
I of the Ohio Constitution.222
Additional Decisions
Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.223 Plaintiff, injured due to alleged defects
in a three-piece wheel rim and tire, brought suit on theories of negligence and
strict liability. The court, affirming the appellate court's reversal of an award of
punitive damages, reiterated the need for "actual malice" in the form of a state
of mind characterized by either "(1)... hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, or
(2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a
great probability of causing substantial harm."224 Misconduct greater than
mere negligence is required and foreseeability cannot be equated with "great
probability." The punitive damages award was improper as the "great
probability" requirement, which is equated with high foreseeability, was not
met.
Leichtamerv. American Motors Corp.225 The presence of fraud, malice, or insult
is required to sustain a punitive damages award. A punitive damages award
was upheld as actual malice could be inferred from defendant's conduct and
the surrounding circumstances. Malice may be shown by intentional, reckless,
wanton, willful, and gross acts. The requisite malice was established by
evidence of advertising which went beyond the merely suggestive in regard to
the vehicle's characteristics and inadequate testing procedures which reflected
a flagrant indifference to the risk posed by a roll-bar which provided
insufficient protection in a pitch-over accident.
Shannon v. Waco Scaffolding & Equip.226 In rejecting a claim for damages under
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.80(A), the court held that punitive damages
are available only where there is conduct that creates a great probability of
222 Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St. 3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994). The only
question is whether the court will ultimately void only the court/jury provision or will,
as it did when treating the collateral source statute in Sorrell, deem § 2307.80 void in its
entirety.
22361 Ohio St. 3d 470, 575 N.E.2d 416 (1991).
2241d. at 473, 575 N.E.2d at 419, relying on Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 512
N.E.2d 1174 (1987). See also Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P., 74 Ohio St.3d 440,659
N.E.2d 1242 (1996) addressing the malice standard in a tort action and reiterating the
rule that the trial judge can direct a verdict denying punitive damages as a matter of
law. The second definition is the most likely to apply in connection with product liability
actions. Accord Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990) (inadequate
evidence that manufacturer knew its product created a great probability of substantial
harm ormadea deliberate decision to market its productwith knowledgeof the danger).
22567 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
2 26Nos. 67406,67604,1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120 (Cuyahoga County July 27, 1995).
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causing substantial harm. A directed verdict was upheld where a warning label
contained an OSHA standard for scaffolding towers, but did not reflect the
Ohio standards.
Long v. Sun Ray Stove Co. 227 An award of punitive damages was upheld for
bum injuries sustained by a child who placed her hand on an oven door. Three
facts combined to support the award: the manufacturer was aware that its oven
did not meet forthcoming standards, technology to reduce the surface
temperature was available, and there was a conscious decision not to warn of
the hazard.
TV. CORPORATE CONCERNS
A. Successor Corporation Liability
Corporations which purchase the assets of another company are frequently
targeted in litigation arising from defects in products manufactured and sold
by the predecessor company. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 228 the
leading Ohio decision addressing the liability of such a purchasing company,
retained the traditional business based rules preventing imposition of liability
absent one of four specific exceptions. This decision also rejected expansion of
corporate successor liability based on the "product line" theory initially
adopted in California.229
The defendant in Flaugher had purchased the assets of several companies
and continued to manufacture and sell the predecessor's Conomatic machines.
Plaintiff alleged injury caused by negligent design and manufacture of the
machine.230
In affirming a motion to dismiss, the court found that the facts failed to show
the presence of any of the four exceptions to the general principle immunizing
successors from such liability. A purchaser of corporate assets is not liable for
defective products manufactured or marketed by the tortious conduct of its
predecessor unless:
1. the buyer expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such
liability; or
2. the transaction represents a de facto consolidation or merger;
or
3. the buyer corporation is merely a continuation of the seller; or
22 7No. 85-CA-44,1986 WL 9675 (Ohio Ct. App. Miami County Sept. 2,1986).
22830 Ohio St. 3d 60,507 N.E.2d 331 (1987). Accord Welco Indus. Inc. v. Applied Cos.,
67 Ohio St. 3d 344,617 N.E.2d 1129 (1993) (contractual obligations rather than products
liability theory).
22 9Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 65-67, 507 N.E.2d at 336-37, rejecting the approach
announced in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) as a "far-reaching and radical
departure from traditional principles, such that its adoption is a matterfor thelegislature
rather than the courts." Id. at 66-67, 507 N.E.2d at 337.
23 0A failure to warn claim was also presented.
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4. the transaction is entered into fraudulently for the purpose of
escaping liability.
231
In its opinion, the court discussed an expanded form of the mere
continuation exception. This principle, which was not adopted, is based on
whether the seller went out of business at the time of sale, whether all assets
were purchased, and whether officers and directors of the seller assume
executive positions with the purchaser. Other courts have, nevertheless,
applied the expanded definition.232
Flaugher analysis is inapplicable to stock purchases through which the selling
company becomes a subsidiary of the purchaser. In such cases liability will be
determined by traditional rules as to whether the corporate veil can be pierced.
Additional Decisions
Davis v. Loopco Industries.233 Summary judgment was improper as there were
fact issues as to whether the asset purchase agreement provided for successor
liability.
Morrison v. Newaygo Engineering & Survey Co.234 Noting that the hallmark of
a de facto merger is an exchange of assets for stock, the court reversed summary
judgment for the defendant as a reasonable jury could find that the Plan and
Agreement of Reorganization was more than a purchase of assets and could
constitute a merger. However, summary judgment for defendant in regard to
the mere continuation exception was affirmed as this theory requires the
continuation of the corporate entity, not the business operation.
Carpenter v. Shape Form, Inc.235 A corporation which repaired and maintained
a press was not liable even though the repair company and the owning
company were incorporated by the same person. The facts failed to come
within any of the four exceptions to immunity.
Burr v. South Bend Lathe, Inc.236 A successor corporation was not liable where
the companies dealt at arm's length, there was no commonality among officers
or shareholders, and there was no assumption of liabilities.
23 1Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 66, 507 N.E.2d at 334. Cf. Deaconess Home Ass'n v.
TurnerConstr., 38 Ohio Misc. 2d 17,526 N.E.2d 1368 (C.P. 1986) (applying a similar rule
to architectural services while rejecting a continuation theory).
232 E.g., Hoover v. Recreation Equip. Corp., 763 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1989); Morgan
v. Hollywood Bases, Inc., No. 61609,1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 201 (Cuyahoga County Jan.
21, 1993).
23366 Ohio St. 3d 64, 609 N.E.2d 144 (1993).
234 No. 66023, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2369 (Cuyahoga County June 2, 1994).
235 No. CA89-07-010, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 219 (Madison County Jan. 16, 1990).
23618 Ohio App. 3d 19, 480 N.E.2d 105 (1984). Accord McGaw v. South Bend Lathe,
Inc., 74 Ohio App. 3d 8,598 N.E.2d 18 (1991).
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B. Industry-Wide Liability
An injured person may be unable to identify the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective product which caused the injury. Cases seeking to impose
industry-wide liability focus on products of a generic nature such as asbestos,
drugs, and lead based paints. The illnesses associated with these products often
manifest years after exposure making it difficult or impossible to obtain the
data necessary to identify their suppliers or manufacturers. Efforts to establish
liability without specific identification of the manufacturer of the product
reflect a variety of approaches. The need to identify the actual tortfeasor is an
aspect of causation which is often labeled "cause in fact" to distinguish it from
proximate cause.
The difficulty of identifying an actual tortfeasor, where it is known that one
of a small number of possible parties is responsible for the harm, has been
obviated by the doctrine of "alternative liability." This burden of proof shifting
doctrine provides that where the conduct of more than one party is tortious
and has caused harm, but there is uncertainty as to which party was the cause,
the burden is upon each defendant to prove that it is not the responsible party.
Each defendant that fails to meet this burden is jointly and severally liable.237
Application of this principle requires that all of the possibly tortious parties be
before the court. An often cited decision holding that this approach is
inadequate for product liability actions and creating a distinct form of action
is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.23 8 Both before and after Sindell variations on this
theme have been recognized in product liability litigation.
23 9
The Ohio Supreme Court has had several opportunities to adopt a far
reaching doctrine for imposition of industry-wide liability upon manufacturers
of generic products. It has either rejected the proffered doctrine or determined
that a given doctrine was not applicable to the facts. Nevertheless, the court
has given indications that the door to such an approach is not fully closed. A
1987 decision, while rejecting market share liability and alternative liability to
support a claim for asbestos related injury, concluded: "[W]e hold that
alternative liability is not applicable to the facts of this case. Even if we were to
237 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)
(1965).
238607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), adopting the theory of "market
share" liability to allow plaintiffs to proceed in an action against various manufacturers
of Diethylstilbesterol (DES), a generic drug.
239 See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(enterprise liability); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)
(National Market Share); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (Probalistic
causation or market share alternative); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.), cert.
denied sum nom., E.R. Squibb & Co. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (Risk Share);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965) (concerted action).
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recognize market-share liability as a viable theory of recovery, this is not the
case in which to do so."240
Ohio's approach to industry-wide liability is well illustrated in Horton v.
Harwick Chemical Coir. 241 Plaintiffs alleged that exposure to asbestos products
at their workplace caused them to suffer from pleural thickening. Suit was
brought against a number of asbestos manufacturers and suppliers. The court
reversed a summary judgment because the lower courts took an overly
restrictive view of proximate cause. 242 Nevertheless, its holding on the
application of alternative liability, affirming the appellate court on this issue,
was described as ending asbestos litigation.2 43
The court reiterated its allegiance to alternative liability as previously
adopted in Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co.244 This principle was described as "a
unique theory to be employed in unique situations."245 Alternative liability
cannot be imposed if the defendants' products do not present a substantially
similar risk of harm. As there was no evidence of this similarity, the appellate
court ruled correctly on this issue.246
Additional Decisions
Grover v. Eli Lilly and C0.247 Like Sindell, this case is predicated on harm
caused by exposure to DES. However, the claim here involved ingestion of the
drug by the maternal grandmother on the theory that this caused the mother
to sustain injury to her reproductive organs which, in turn, led to the premature
birth of plaintiff and his birth defects. The court ruled that liability for distribu-
240Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 52, 514 N.E.2d 691, 702
(1987).
24173 Ohio St. 3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196 (1995).
2421d. at 686,653 N.E.2d at 1202.
2431d. at 689, 653 N.E.2d at 1203; (DouglasJ. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24415 Ohio St. 3d 396, 473 N.E.2d 1199 (1984). (adopting alternative liability as set forth
in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) and the Restatement in an action where
plaintiff's injury was caused by one of two possible suppliers of a solvent and both were
before the court).
24 5Horton, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 688, 653 N.E.2d at 1203.
2461d. Furthermore, the court again announced that its earlier decision did not
foreclose the possibility of applying alternate liability to asbestos litigation where it
could be shown that each defendant acted tortiously. Id. at 687,653 N.E.2d at 1202-03,
relying on Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 46,514 N.E.2d at 696.
24763 Ohio St. 3d 756, 591 N.E.2d 696 (1992). This decision does not address theories
of industry-wide liability, but is included as the facts do not make clear that the identity
of the actual manufacturer was known. It appears that had plaintiff succeeded on the
duty issue, alternative liability or other industry-wide theories would have had to be
addressed.
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tion and manufacture of a prescription drug does not extend to persons who
were not exposed to the drug, either directly or in utero.248
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.249 This case represents the leading
decision as to application of alternative liability principles in product liability
litigation. The court recognized the doctrine, but held that it could not be
applied because (1) plaintiff was unable to lay the necessary foundation as to
the presence of all tortious parties and (2) not all forms of asbestos created
substantially similar risks of harm. Market share liability was not a viable
theory as it could not be shown that the forms of asbestos to which plaintiff
was exposed were fungible. The absence of fungibility distinguished this
asbestos case from DES based litigation.
Jackson v. Glidden Co. 250 In this class action suit,251 alleging lead poisoning
from exposure to paint and paint products, the court impliedly held that neither
enterprise liability, market share liability, nor alternative liability substitute for
proof that a defendant's product was the proximate cause of harm. This ruling
did not preclude the court from denying a motion to dismiss as to two of the
three industry-wide theories pled by the plaintiffs.
Enterprise liability25 2 was inapplicable as plaintiff did not allege that
defendants were jointly aware of the risk or that in their joint capacity they
could have reduced that risk. This claim was properly dismissed.
Market share liability, as defined in Sindell, was recognized as a cause of
action. Plaintiffs' allegations that lead paint and lead paint products were
completely fungible and that a substantial share of all producers in Ohio were
before the court, were sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss.
Alternative liability was also available as a cause of action. Plaintiffs'
allegations that defendants committed tortious acts and that they were injured
as a result were sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss even though not
all potential defendants were joined.
248Relying, in part, on Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 868 (1991) (rejecting a similar claim despite this court's acceptance of national
market share liability in Hymowitz).
24933 Ohio St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
25098 Ohio App. 3d 100, 647 N.E.2d 879 (1995). See also In re Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc.,
185 B.R. 42,27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 472 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (a lead paint case denying recovery
against five defendants, based on a Massachusetts decision, as to allow recovery would
create a substantial possibility that tortfeasors and innocent actors would be
intermingled); Andonian v. A.C. & S. Inc., 97 Ohio App. 3d 572, 647 N.E.2d 190 (1994)
(rejecting concert of action for lack of knowledge in an asbestos based action); Tirey v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Ohio Misc. 2d 50,513 N.E.2d 825 (C.P. 1986) (rejecting
alternative liability, market-share liability, enterprise liability, and a concert of action
theory in a case predicated on injuries caused by multipiece wheel).
2 51The question of class certification was deferred pending resolution of a motion to
dismiss.
2 52 As defined in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
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Fiorella v. Ashland Oil, Inc.253 The suppliers of benzene to plaintiff's employer
obtained summary judgment as plaintiff failed to join all suppliers as
defendants thereby failing to establish a predicate for application of alternative
liability.
C. Component Manufacturers
The provider of manufactured parts used to assemble a larger product is
treated as a manufacturer rather than a supplier. The statutory definition of
manufacturer includes those who "rebuild a product or a component of a
product."254 This categorization has several important ramifications to
component manufacturers including: (1) that they are subject to suit by
product liability claimants in the same manner as any other manufacturer; (2)
the potential for indemnity claims between the manufacturer/assembler
("assembler") of the finished product and its component part providers; and (3)
a "component supplier" defense.
Direct actions against component manufacturers are based on defects in the
component part which cause the completed product to fail and cause injury.
These actions, from the perspective of the claimant, are identical to claims
against any manufacturer. In many cases where a claimant brings suit against
the assembler, that claimant could also have brought suit directly against the
component supplier.255 Such a fact pattern is illustrated byAnderson v. Olmstead
Utility Equipment Co. 256
Anderson, though decided under the common law, addressed when a
component manufacturer will be treated as a manufacturer 257 rather than a
supplier as well as aspects of the indemnity issue as between a component
manufacturer and an assembler. This action was commenced by workers who
25392 Ohio App. 3d 411, 635 N.E.2d 1306 (1993). See also Shea v. BASF Corp., No.
11-95-2, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3264 (Paulding County Aug. 8,1995) (Plaintiff's failure
to establish that any defendant committed the tortious act was a failure to establish an
essential element of alternative liability).
2 54 OHIo REv. CODE § 2307.71(0). The terms "supplier" and "manufacturer" are
mutually exclusive. Brown v. McDonald's Corp., 101 Ohio App. 3d 294,655 N.E.2d 440
(1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kupanoff Imports, Inc., 83 Ohio App. 3d 278, 614
N.E.2d 1072 (1992).
25 5Nevertheless, claimants often bring suit only against the assembler because they
do not learn the identity or role of a component manufacturer until discovery is taken.
A claimant may also limit the designated defendants for tactical reasons.
25660 Ohio St. 3d 124, 573 N.E.2d 626 (1991). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Fry, 22
Ohio App. 3d 94, 489 N.E.2d 294 (1984) (indemnity action against manufacturer of
allegedly defective roofing materials).
257 Whether a defendant is a manufacturer or a supplier (who benefits from the
protections afforded by Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.78) is a question of law. Chaney v. Newco
of Janesville, Inc., No. 9-91-45, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3232 (Marion County June 16,
1992); Vercellotti v. YMCA, No. L-91-121, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2340 (Lucas County
May 8, 1992).
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were injured when a rebuilt "cherry picker" failed causing them to fall to the
ground. Olmstead Utility Equipment ("Olmstead") rebuilt the aerial system of
the cherry picker truck and installed the rebuilt system pursuant to a contract
with the owner which called for a full tear down of the system and replacement
of necessary parts. The device failed due to an alleged defect in the components
of its hydraulic lift system which had been manufactured by third party
defendants.
Olmstead, through its remanufacturing and rebuilding of the system, was a
seller and a manufacturer and was, therefore, subject to liability under theories
of strict liability in tort as well as breach of contract.258 As a manufacturer of
the completed system, Olmstead had a right to seek indemnity from the
component manufacturers if it could prove that the system failure was caused
by a defect in a part they manufactured or supplied. The court reasoned that.
[if one of the components in the finished product is defective, then
the finished product may become defective as a result.. .. If a
component part manufacturer or supplier creates the danger by
placing the product into the stream of commerce, liability can, in
certain situations be shifted away from the manufacturer of the
finished product.2t9
A different approach applies when an injured party brings suit directly
against a component manufacturer who then asserts that it is not subject to
liability for a defect in the final product-the component supplier defense. This
defense is asserted where there was no defect in the component part and the
harm was caused by a system design failure as illustrated in Kremer v. Durion
Co.260 Plaintiff was sprayed by nitric acid which was released through an open
plug valve, manufactured by Durion, that was incorporated into the design of
a holding tank. The valve functioned within its design parameters, but plaintiff
claimed that it should have contained a retardation system that would have
prevented its being left open. Durion argued that the valve was manufactured
for the transmission of all types of liquids and was for sale on the open market.
In addition, Durion lacked knowledge as to how the valve would be used or
what fluids would be transmitted through it.
258 That title to the truck remained with its owner had no relevance to this
determination. Discussion of contractual rights between the parties is beyond the scope
of this article.
259Anderson, 60 Ohio St. 3d at 131, 573 N.E.2d at 633.
26040 Ohio App. 3d 183, 532 N.E.2d 165 (1983). See also Griffin v. Heinz U.S.A., No.
C-88-7486, slip op. (N.D. Ohio 1989) (tomato elevator is part of the larger tomato
processing system and the elevator manufacturer had no duty to warn of dangers
associated with elevator maintenance); Searls v. Doe, 29 Ohio App. 3d 309, 505 N.E.2d
287 (1986) (manufacturer of a can ejector device installed into an assembly line not liable
for failure to warn of dangers of the overall system). Accord Williams v. Morgan
Adhesives Co., No. 13411,1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1590 (Summit County Apr. 27, 1988).
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The court ruled that the valve was not, in and of itself, dangerous or
defective. Rather, it functioned in the manner for which it was designed. Durion
could not anticipate how this valve would be utilized and there was nothing
unique in its design. As a component supplier, in such circumstances, Durion
could not be liable for the manner in which the assembler incorporated the
valve into the holding tank system. 261
Additional Decisions
Schaffer v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. 262 Relying on Brennaman v.
R.P.L Inc.,263 the courtheld that the manufacturer of a non-defective component
part has no duty to warn of dangers that may result when the part is integrated
into another product or system where the component manufacturer was not
involved in the design or assembly of the integrated end product.
Jacobs v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 264 Du Pont, the supplier of plastics
used in the manufacture of a jaw implant, was deemed a component part
manufacturer with no duty to warn end-users of the finished product of its
potentially dangerous nature. The duty to warn does not extend to speculative
anticipation of how non-defective components can become dangerous when
integrated into a final product. Suppliers of raw materials are not guarantors
of finished products over which they have little control.
Leibreich v. A.J. Refrigeration, Inc.265 Summary judgment was denied to the
supplier of components used in the assembly of a refrigerated delivery truck
where that supplier played a role in the truck's design and assembly. Whether
the supplier was subject to strict liability as a manufacturer was a fact question.
Although the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of the Act, the
court relied on the definition of manufacturer contained in Ohio Revised Code
section 2307.01(I).
D. Exceptions to Workers' Compensation Immunity
Consistent with the mandate of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution,
Ohio Revised Code section 4123.74 provides that employers who comply with
the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 266 "shall not be liable to
respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, occupational
261The court rejected the assertion that the absence of a retardation system rendered
the valve defective and also rejected a claim of liability predicated on failure to warn.
262No. 74 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 1996). The opinion can also be read as suggesting that
component manufacturers cannot be strictly liable for a design defect absent proof that
such a defectexisted and that it, as distinct from the end product, was a proximate cause
of the harm.
26370 Ohio St. 3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994).
26467 F.3d 1219 (6th Cir. 1995).
26567 Ohio St. 3d 266, 617 N.E.2d 1068 (1993).
266 OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4123.01-4123.94.
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disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by any employee in the
course of or arising out of his employment..."
The scope of this immunity became an issue when the courts developed two
theories-the "dual capacity" doctrine and an expanded definition of
intentional tort-which permit an employee to bring a tort action in addition
to a workers' compensation claim. The Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered and
rejected the dual capacity doctrine in Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,267
which abolished this method of circumventing workers' compensation
immunity in product liability based cases.2
68
Perhaps no common law development better illustrates the clash between
judicial and legislative objectives than does the history of the intentional tort
exception to workers' compensation immunity. As many intentional tort
actions involve product related injuries, this doctrine bears a direct correlation
to product liability law. Since the decision in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chemicals, Inc.269 established the doctrine in 1982, the General Assembly has
passed three Acts directed to limiting its application. The first two Acts have
been declared unconstitutional.270 The third effort took effect on October 1,
1995.
This Act provides for a one year statute of limitations with a discovery
rule.271 It further provides that an employer is liable if there is proof "by clear
and convincing evidence that the employer deliberately committed all of the
elements of an intentional tort."272 An "employment intentional tort" means "an
act committed by an employer in which the employer deliberately and
26744 Ohio St. 3d 148, 541 N.E.2d 1040 (1989); followed Smith v. Taylor Rental, 747
F.Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1990). This doctrine defeats workers' compensation immunity
by recognizing that an employer can act in two distinct roles. When acting in the first
role, that of an employer, the immunity attaches. When acting in the second role, that
of a manufacturer marketing goods to consumers - thereby undertaking unrelated and
independent obligations - the immunity does not attach. Thus, if an employee is injured
by a product manufactured by his or her employer, in the course of his or her
employment, the doctrine permits a tort action. Schump held that an employee injured
by a product manufactured and sold by his or her employer can sue the employer only
when injured as a member of the public i.e., when acting outside the scope of
employment.
26 8Cf. Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978)
(hospital-medical malpractice). This limited use of dual capacity will, no doubt, be
subject to challenge based on the reasoning set forth in Schump.
26969 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
2 70OHIO REV. CODE § 4121.80, effective August 22,1986 was held unconstitutional in
Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St. 3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722 (1991); the provisions
of Am. Sub. H.B. 107, passed in July, 1993 were held unconstitutionally enacted in State
ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St. 3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582 (1994).
271OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.112.
2 7 2 OHIO REV. CODE § 2745.01.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 431 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
intentionally injures, causes an occupational disease, or death of an
employee."273
Blankenship held that an employee is not precluded from enforcing common
law remedies against his employer for an intentional tort. The complaint
alleged that employees had become sick by exposure to toxic substances in the
workplace and that the employer, with knowledge of the conditions, took no
steps to correct them and failed to warn employees of the danger. The trial and
appellate court decisions dismissing the complaint based on workers'
compensation immunity were reversed. The court held that it is for the trier of
fact to initially determine whether the alleged conduct constituted an
intentional tort. No definition of the term was provided, but it clearly meant
something more expansive than traditional assault or battery.
The definitional void was filled through the opinion in Jones v. VIP
Development Co. 274 The court rejected the proposition that a specific intent to
injure is necessary to support a finding of intentional misconduct. Such intent
exists when an act is "committed with the intent to injure another, or committed
with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur."275 The element
of substantial certainty is used to distinguish merely negligent conduct from
intentionally tortious conduct. Guidance was provided by the court's
recognition of a three level conduct analysis:
Where a defendant acts despite his knowledge that the risk is
appreciable, his conduct is negligent. Where the risk is great, his
actions may be characterized as reckless or wanton, butnot intentional.
The actor must know or believe that harm is a substantially certain
consequence of his act before intent to injure will be inferred. [This intent]
may be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances.276
As of October 31, 1995 the intentional tort exception to workers'
compensation immunity is defined and limited by Ohio Rev. Code section
2745.01. Decisional law, most likely consistent with past precedents, will
govern this section's interpretation and application. Whether it will withstand
likely constitutional challenge remains an open question.
Additional Decisions
Cantrell v. GAF Corp.277 A judgment in favor of plaintiffs for their fear of an
increased risk of cancer based on workplace exposure to asbestos was upheld
273OHio REV. CODE § 2745.01(D)(1). Additional devices to limit the bringing of such
actions, including the use of summary judgment and the power to impose sanctions
upon attorneys for noncompliance with specified procedures, are set forth in part (C)
of this section.
27415 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
2751d. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051.
2761d. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1050 (emphasis added).
277999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993).
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under the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation immunity. There
was sufficient evidence to allow a jury determination consistent with Ohio law.
The evidence went beyond failure to warn and included testimony that
defendant, with knowledge that injury and even death were substantially
certain to occur from asbestos exposure, continued to expose employees to
asbestos and failed to advise employees of the results of medical screening tests.
Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc.278 Plaintiff was injured during the operation of a conveyor
belt after the employer had removed a Plexiglass safety guard. The court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the employer on the grounds that
there were sufficient facts to permit a jury to ascertain whether the requisite
intent for an intentional tort was present. The analysis of intentional tort
standards was predicated on Blankenship-Jones as explained in Van Fossen v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co. 279
Wedge Products, Inc. v. Hartford Equity Sales Co.280 An insurance policy which
provided coverage for bodily injuries "neither expected nor intended" by the
employer was inapplicable to intentional tort actions brought by employees
injured during the operation of punch presses. This interpretation of the
contract was supported by the public policy against insuring for loss caused
by intentional torts.
Holtz v. Schutt Pattern Works Co.281 Summary judgment in favor of the
employer was reversed where there was evidence that the conduct
surrounding an employee's injury, sustained while operating a jointer wood
stripping machine lacking an available safety device, could permit a reasonable
jury to find that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
27859 Ohio St. 3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108 (1991).
27936 Ohio St. 3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988). See also Shannon v. Waco Scaffolding &
Equip., Nos. 67406,67604,1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120 (Cuyahoga CountyJuly 27,1995)
relying on Van Fossen to hold that proven violations of safety regulations do not
necessarily establish an intent to harm.
28031 Ohio St. 3d 65, 509 N.E.2d 74 (1987).
28189 Ohio App. 3d 663,626 N.E.2d 1029 (1993). Numerous decisions have reviewed
intentional tort claims. See, e.g., Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St. 3d 541,
584 N.E.2d 729 (1992); after remand, 93 Ohio App. 3d 740, 639 N.E.2d 1203 (1994)
(hazardous materials); Magness v. Poellnitz, No. C-941018,1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5029
(Hamilton County Nov. 15,1995) (as related to co-employee assault and battery); Brunn
v. Valley Tool & Die, Inc., No. 68811, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4992 (Cuyahoga County
Nov. 9,1995) (power press); Stump v. Industrial Steeplejack Co., No. 66937, 1995 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1935 (Cuyahoga County May 11, 1995) (scaffold and rope grab); Reese v.
Euclid Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 103 Ohio App. 3d 141, 103 N.E.2d 141 (1995) (safety
belt); Felden v. Ashland Chem. Co., 91 Ohio App. 3d 48,631 N.E.2d 689 (1993) (forklift
collision); Volter v. C. Schmidt Co., 74 Ohio App. 3d 36, 598 N.E.2d 35 (1991) (press
brake).
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V. EXPERT WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE
A. Experts and Scientific Evidence
In product liability litigation it is a virtual necessity that expert testimony be
provided to establish the existence of a manufacture or design defect.282 The
burden of proof in such cases, and the nature of the required evidence, compels
the presentation of opinion evidence from a qualified expert as the fact to be
ascertained is usually beyond the knowledge of an average juror.283 In product
liability actions compliance with the mandate of Ohio Rule of Evidence 702(A),
that expert testimony is permitted only when it "either relates to matters
beyond the knowledge or expertise possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons,"284 is virtually a given. Only in
rare cases will there be sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a defect
issue to reach the jury without expert testimony.285
These principles are illustrated in Dent v. Ford Motor Co. 286 where, after a
motion in limine precluding plaintiff's expert from testifying was granted, an
automobile manufacturer was awarded partial summary judgment because
there was no evidence to support plaintiff's defect allegations. Similarly,
summary judgment was affirmed in favor of a tire manufacturer for harm
caused by a tire that exploded during mounting. Plaintiff admitted that he had
not obtained a verbal opinion as to the cause of the alleged defect and his own
expert apparently found no defect. Absent qualified expert testimony to esta-
282Failure to comply with discovery mandates, pursuant to either Local Rules of Court
or the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, can have drastic effects. See, e.g., Shumaker v.
Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 28 Ohio St. 3d 367,504 N.E.2d 44 (1986) (testimony as to
the causal link between chemical exposure and pancreatic cancer improperly admitted
as the claim was not disclosed); Tritt v. Judd's Moving & Storage, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 3d
206,574 N.E.2d 1178 (1990) (excluding surprise testimony of accident reconstructionist).
Expert testimony may be excluded as a sanction for violation of OHIO R. CIv. P. 26. Jones
v. Murphy, 12 Ohio St. 3d 84,465 N.E.2d 444 (1984). But see Downs v. Quallich, 90 Ohio
App. 3d 799,630 N.E.2d 775 (1993) (allowing allegedly surprise testimony, consistent
with the Civil Rules and a Local Rule of Court, where adequate notice was deemed
provided through the expert's report and deposition testimony).
283 Hynes v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 5-87-22, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3082
(Hancock County July 15, 1988).
284This language replaces the earlier mandate that expert testimony could be utilized
where such knowledge would "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." As the new languge reflects prior decisional law defining
"assist the trier of fact," it is intended to clarify existing law rather than make a
substantive change. See OHIO R. EvID. 702, Staff Note.
285 See Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster Inc., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984)
(circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue as to the cause of a silo collapse).
28683 Ohio App. 3d 283, 614 N.E.2d 1074 (1992).
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blish the existence of defect, plaintiff was unable to make a sufficient prima
facie case.287
1. Qualification of the Expert Witness
Before expert testimony as to the existence of a defect can be presented, the
trial court must ascertain whether the witness is qualified as an expert. Analysis
begins with Ohio Rule of Evidence 104(A) which delegates responsibility to the
trial court to determine preliminary questions as to qualification of persons to
be witnesses, the existence of privilege, and the admissibility of evidence. In
addition, Ohio Rule of Evidence 702(B) provides that a witness can qualify as
an expert by virtue of "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education regarding the subject matter of the testimony." The rule is consistent
with prior law.288 From this broad statement several principles have been
derived:
1. The expert need not be the best expert or have the best
credentials
289
2. The expert need not be completely or extensively
knowledgeable in the subject;290
3. The expert can testify only as to a part of the total information
required;2
91
4. The necessary expertise can be based on sufficient excerience
without regard to specialized training or education; 292 and
287Hodgkinson v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 38 Ohio App. 3d 101, 526 N.E.2d 89
(1987). See also Chaplynski v. Van Holle, No. CA91-08-060,1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1929
(Clermont County Apr. 13,1992) (applying OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.73).
288 The Staff Note indicates that Rule 702(B) codifies State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213,
551 N.E.2d 970 (1990) (evidence not admissible when knowledge is within the ken of
the jury); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124,489 N.E.2d 795, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986)
(evidence admissible if sufficiently beyond common experience); and State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (evidence inadmissible if not beyond the ken
of the average lay person). See also Weil v. Este Oils Co., 93 Ohio App. 3d 759,639 N.E.2d
1215 (1994) (court may exclude expert testimony which is neither complex nor beyond
comprehension of the average person). Note: This article presents Ohio law. Unless
otherwise indicated, no discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence will be presented.
The Federal Rules differ significantly from the Ohio Rules as exemplified in Rule 702
(testimony of experts) and Rule 705 (disclosure of underlying data - hypothetical
questions).
289 See Scott v. Yates, 71 Ohio St. 3d 219,643 N.E.2d 105 (1994); State v. Tomlin, 63 Ohio
St. 3d 724, 590 N.E.2d 1253 (1992).
290 Mullins v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 14426,1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4832 (Montgomery
County Oct. 26, 1994); Higginbotham v. Perez, No. 93APE12-1711, 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3949 (Franklin County Sept. 6,1994).
29 1Shilling v. Mobile Analytical Servs., Inc., 65 Ohio St.3d 252,602 N.E.2d 1154 (1992).
292 Lin v. Khan, No. 93APE-1252, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1900 (Franklin County May
3, 1994). Cf. Behanan v. Desco Distrib. Co., 98 Ohio App. 3d 23, 647 N.E.2d 830 (1994)
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5. The expert may testify only as to areas within his or her
expertise.
293
Scott v. Yates 294 illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining whether a witness is
qualified as an expert. In this 4-3 decision the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a veteran accident
investigator, the Deputy who investigated the accident scene, was qualified to
render an opinion as to the cause of the collision. The court focused on both
former Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 and Rule 104(A). The Deputy, with a twelfth
grade education, attended the police academy which included a two week
period devoted to accident investigation. He was not familiar with relevant
aspects of the laws of physics and testified that there was a distinction between
investigating an accident and reconstructing one, which he had never
previously done. The dissenters urged affirmance as the Deputy had
investigated over 1500 accidents a year while with the Sheriff's Department,
his academy training included determinations as to the cause of an accident,
and he had received on the job training regarding "point of impact tracking"
and causation.
2. Substantive Requirements
a. Certainty, Basis for Opinion, and Related Requirements
That expert testimony, as any other evidence, must be relevant needs no
discussion.295 Expert evidence must also be specific, reliable, and credible. The
recent decision of Stinson v. England,2 96 a medical malpractice action, addresses
(working at a dry cleaning establishment for thirty years insufficient to render an expert
opinion on design of a pressing machine).
293Mullins, No. 14426, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4832 (scope of engineer's testimony);
Grigsby v. Anesthesiologist of SW Ohio, Inc., No. C-930008,1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1814(Hamilton County Apr. 27, 1994) (nurse anesthetist could testify as to standard of care
in administration of anesthesia, but not as to facts of improper administration).
29471 Ohio St. 3d 219, 643 N.E.2d 105 (1994). See also State v. Clark, 101 Ohio App. 3d
389, 411-414, 655 N.E.2d 795, 808-11 (1995).
2 95 See OHIO R. EvID. 401, 402. See also Deans v. Allegheny Int'l (USA), Inc., 69 Ohio
App. 3d 349, 590N.E.2d825 (1990) (excluding expert testimony of lawn moweraccidents
prior to the design of the mower); State v. Clark, 101 Ohio App. 3d 389, 655 N.E.2d 795(1995). A motion in limine was granted in Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. American
Centennial Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc.2d 258,660 N.E.2d 819 (C.P. 1995), precluding expert
state of the art testimony as irrelevant to the question of insurance coverage in this
asbestos litigation due to the absence of foundation evidence establishing the insured's
intent. This is one of ten rulings made by the court between February, 1993 and
September, 1995, in regard to various indemnity, coverage, discovery, and summaryjudgment issues. The rulings are reported at 74 Ohio Misc.2d 144 - 272, 660 N.E.2d 746
- 828. Questions of application are posed by both OHIO R. EVID. 704 (allowing experts
to testify as to ultimate issues of fact) and OHIO R. EVID. 705 (disclosure of facts or
inferences underlying the expert opinion).
29669 Ohio St. 3d 451, 633 N.E.2d 532 (1994).
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the probability rule.297 This action was brought on behalf of a woman, treated
by defendant, and her child. They appealed an adverse jury verdict.
Defendants' expert, Dr. Ross, testified that the child's injuries "could be caused
by three events: (1) maternal hypertension, (2) placental insufficiency (i.e., the
theory of appellants), or (3) compression of the umbilical cord. Of these three
possibilities, Dr. Ross stated that the "most likely" cause of the injuries was the
compression of the umbilical cord."
2 98
In reversing and remanding for a new trial the court reiterated the rule that
expert opinion as to causation must be based on probability. Plaintiffs' expert
had provided sufficient evidence to raise a prima facie case of negligence. Thus,
the defense had to adduce competent evidence to negate that testimony. The
testimony of Dr. Ross was insufficient. Expert testimony as to causation is
competent only if it specifies the probable cause of the occurrence, not possible
causes. Probability means more than a fifty percent likelihood. Testimony that
one of three causes is the "most likely" fails to achieve this threshold. 299
In addition to meeting the probability standard, expert testimony must meet
the demand of Ohio Rule of Evidence 703 that the facts or data relied upon by
the expert to reach an opinion or inference be "those perceived by him or
admitted in evidence at the hearing." This requirement was cogently presented
in Naugle v. Campbell Soup Co. 300 In this case the plaintiff injured his hand in the
rollers of a coating machine used in the manufacture of cans. The machine
manufacturer's award of summary judgment was affirmed. Plaintiff's expert
submitted an affidavit concluding that the machine was defective and the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Nothing in the affidavit stated that it was
made on the personal knowledge of the expert. The expert did not examine the
machine and had only examined drawings and illustrations depicting it which
he had not prepared. The affidavit failed to meet both the personal knowledge
requirement of Rule 703 and the basis for opinion requirement of Rule 705.
29 7This decision also addresses the proper utilization of "learned treatises" as an
exception to the hearsay rule. As the Ohio Rules of Evidence have no equivalent to the
exception found in FED. R. EvID. 803(18), Ohio law allows the use of learned treatises for
purposes of impeachment, but not contradiction. Stinson, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 458, 633
N.E.2d at 539.
298Id. at 454, 633 N.E.2d at 536.
2991d. at 4456,4457,633 N.E.2d at 538. See also Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons,
Inc., 28 Ohio St. 3d 367,504 N.E.2d 44 (1986); Dellenbach v. Robinson, 95 Ohio App. 3d
358,642 N.E.2d 638 (1993) (medical testimony based on "medical probability"admissible
as equivalent to "reasonable degree of medical certainty"); Pasala v. Brown Derby, Inc.,
71 Ohio App. 3d 636,594 N.E.2d 1142 (1991) (evidence of future physical and emotional
harm excluded as not reasonably certain).
300No. 7-84-24, 1986 WL 7312 (Ohio Ct. App. Henry County June 20, 1986). See also
State v. Solomon, 59 Ohio St. 3d 124, 570 N.E.2d 1118 (1991) (medical testimony in a
medical case admissible under Rule 703 and stressing that the rule uses the disjunctive
"or" in its allowance of reliance upon "facts or data perceived"). Id. at 126, 570 N.E.2d at
1120; Steinfurth v. Armstrong World Indus., 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 21,500 N.E.2d 409 (C.P.
1986) (construing Rule 703).
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b. Reliability - Scientific Evidence a/k/a Galileo's Revenge and Tycho Brahe3°1
Ascertaining whether expert evidence is sufficiently grounded in fact and
science as to be admissible has long plagued both state and federal courts. The
extent to which Ohio courts applying Ohio Rule of Evidence 702, as amended,
will rely on federal precedent is not yet clear. There may be little substantive
difference, as distinct from the obvious differences in the Rules as written,
between the Ohio Rule and the federal rule as interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3o2 Ohio courts rejected the rule of Frye v. United
States303 prior to its rejection in Daubert. The Staff Note to amended Ohio Rule
of Evidence 702 observes that although the Ohio courts had not adopted a
definitive test for the reliability requirement, they have rejected Frye.3o04 The
Staff Note also advises that in ascertaining reliability the discussion in Daubert
may be relevant and '"helpful in construing the Ohio rule."
Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 rejects any concept that expert evidence is
admissible if relevant with its reliability only treated as a question of weight
and credibility for the jury.305 Prior to adoption of the amendments to Rule 702,
a reliability standard existed which permitted exclusion of expert testimony if
the court found that either (1) the underlying theory and principles utilized, or
(2) their application, were unreliable.306 Nevertheless, the prior rule suffered
from ambiguity and decisional law provided inadequate guidance to the lower
courts. The new Rule 702, with its far greater detail, is directed toward
resolution of this ambiguity.
In addition to its mandates as to when expert testimony is appropriate and
when a person is qualified as an expert, the Rule now provides explicit
instruction as to when evidence is reliable. Expert scientific testimony must be
based on reliable scientific, technical, or other information. If the testimony
relies on the results of any procedure, test, or experiment it is reliable only if:
1. The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is
based is objectively verifiable or validly derived from widely
accepted knowledge, facts, or principles;
2. The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably
implements the theory; and
301Brahe was the last great astronomer to oppose Copernicus. His story is told in
Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
302113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
303293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
304Relying on State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St. 3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 107 (1992) and State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
305This approach was suggested in State v. Pierce despite the court's discussion of the
reliability of the principles posited in the case.
306See State v. Bresson, 51 Ohio St. 3d 123, 554 N.E.2d 1330 (1990); State v. Williams,
4 Ohio St. 3d 53,446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
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3. The procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way
that will yield an accurate result.
307
This set of standards parallels the primary focus of Daubert. As with the
Daubert approach, the trial judge will be the "gatekeeper" whose job it is to open
or close the gate of admissibility to proposed expert scientific evidence. If the
Ohio courts observe the Staff Note suggestion that Daubert analysis can be
relevant and helpful, a number of detailed inquiries set forth by the Supreme
Court will be used to supplement the tri-part approach of Ohio Rule of
Evidence 702(C). These inquiries include whether the theory or technique
involved: (1) can be (and has been) tested--an empirical element; (2) has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has a known or potential rate of
error; and (4) is governed by the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation.308 The judge may also, but need not,
consider the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community.309 The focus of these
inquiries is directed to the principles and methodology rather than the
conclusions they generate. 310 They require that the expert's testimony be based
on good, as distinct from perfect, grounds. The trial court gatekeeper can also
consider a variety of other factors such as the novelty of the approach and its
relation to established procedures, the qualifications of the witness, and
non-judicial uses of the approach. 3 11 Full application of Daubert analysis
requires a two step approach: first an inquiry as to relevance; second an inquiry
into reliability. This approach is similarly mandated by Ohio law.
The meaning of "scientific knowledge," the area in which Daubert focuses
and applies, was considered in State v. Clark.312 In this criminal proceeding a
state witness was called to reconstruct the crime scene through a special
computer program. After finding the witness qualified, and the proffered
testimony relevant, the court turned to the question of whether this evidence
was reliable. Because Daubert was predicated on Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which was identical to the former Ohio rule, the essential principles of Daubert
were summarized. They were found insufficient, however, because crime scene
307OHio R. EviD. 702(C).
30 8Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
309 d. at 2797.
3 10 d. The Court also stresses that this is to be a flexible standard.
311Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. Litig., 35 F.3d 717 at 742, n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (multiple facets of
expert testimony in the context of a claim that physical ailments were caused by
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls-PCB's). See also United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding admission of DNA testing in a criminal proceeding);
Cantrell v. OAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993) (allowing evidence relating asbestos
exposure to laryngeal cancer).
312101 Ohio App. 3d 389, 655 N.E.2d 795 (1995). Despite the importance of the legal
issues and distinctions raised in this opinion, a discretionary appeal was denied. 72 Ohio
St. 3d 1548, 650 N.E.2d 1367 (1995).
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or accident reconstruction testimony, unlike chemical structure, DNA, and
stenographic voice analysis, was deemed within the realm of "technical or other
specialized knowledge" rather than scientific knowledge.313 For such
computer modeling the test of reliability is "a sufficient showing that:(1) the
computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and underlying equations are
sufficiently complete and accurate (and disclosed to the opposing party, so that
they may challenge them); and (3) the program is generally accepted by the
appropriate community of scientists." 314 Even though the third element is that
of the Frye rule, rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in analysis of scientific
knowledge cases, its use was held appropriate in this distinct type of case.
Additional Decisions
Qualifications:
Shilling v. Mobile Analytical Services, Inc.3 15 A Ph.D. neurotoxicologist/
psychologist, who was not a physician, could testify as to the diagnosis of a
medical condition where the testimony was within his expertise. The witness
was competent to testify that the ingestion of gasoline caused injury to the brain
and nervous system. That additional testimony might be needed to show the
causal link between the brain damage and other symptoms did not negate the
ability of this witness to testify in areas of his expertise.316
Shannon v. Waco Scaffolding & Equipment.317 Decisions as to whether a witness
is qualified as an expert are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. A
trial court determination that a witness could testify as to engineering
principles, physics, and adequacy of warning in regard to the use of a scaffold
was upheld even though the witness had no mechanical or engineering
qualifications. The witness's business experience, membership in relevant
3131d. 101 Ohio App. 3d at 415, 655 N.E.2d at 812. The court also found, relying on
State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St. 3d 490, 501, 597 N.E.2d 107,115-16 (1992), that the reliability
of expert testimony goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. This
ruling is inconsistent with amended Rule 702(C).
3141d. at 416, 655 N.E.2d at 812 quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison
Co., 591 N.E.2d 165 at 168 (Mass. 1992). Cf. State v. Martens, 90 Ohio App. 3d 338, 629
N.E.2d 462 (1993) (utilizing the "commonly accepted in the community" standard to
permit testimony of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder despite recognition that Daubert
limits this standard).
31565 Ohio St. 3d 252, 602 N.E.2d 1154 (1992).
3 16The court explained that the term "medical witnesses" as used in Damell v.
Eastman, 23 Ohio St. 13,261 N.E.2d 114 (1970) did not require that a witness be a medical
doctor.
3 17Nos. 67406,67604, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120 (Cuyahoga County July 27, 1995).
Cf. Paul v. Moore, 102 Ohio App. 3d 748, 658 N.E.2d 10 (1995) (surveyor and
computer-aided drafting operator treated as lay witnesses where their testimony was
limited to laying a foundation for exhibits which graphically represented an accident
scene).
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professional organizations, and familiarity with applicable regulations was
sufficient to provide him with greater knowledge than that of an ordinary juror.
Kitchens v. McKay.318 A trial court determination that an expert was not
qualified to address the crashworthiness of a van type vehicle was upheld even
though the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion.
Although the witness held three degrees, including an Associate Degree in
Mechanical Engineering Technology, he lacked relevant studies in physics, had
not taught nor published, and his employment experience had little bearing on
the issues. The trial court also based its decision on the witness's limited
experience with vans and lack of experience in anatomy, physiology, or human
injury tolerance.
Substantive Requirements:
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity.319 This medical malpractice wrongful death action
clearly delineates the probability rule. One expert testified that "there is no
possible way ... to ascertain with any degree of certainty whether with medical
intervention, the individual would have survived or died."320 Another testified
that although death was certain without surgery "there certainly is a chance
and I can't say exactly what-maybe around 50%-that he would survive with
surgery."321 The court, concerned that a lesser standard would permit
conjecture and speculation, adopted the rule that causation evidence had to
meet the "probability" standard of more likely than not. The testimony was,
therefore, insufficient.
McDonald v. Ford Motor Co. 322 Uncontradicted defense testimony asserted
that a steering column collapsed, as required by federal regulation, when the
vehicle struck a tree. This testimony was consistent with the results of an
examination of the column and the court observed that the best direct evidence
of a defect in a product is the product itself. The court affirmed a directed
verdict by application of the "physical facts" rule to disregard plaintiffs'
evidence (of an earlier failure causing loss of vehicle control) as speculative.
The Syllabus provides: "The testimony of witnesses which is positively
contradicted by the established physical facts is of no probative value and a
jury will not be permitted to rest a verdict thereon."323
31838 Ohio App. 3d 165, 528 N.E.2d 603 (1987).
31927 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
3201d. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
321Id. See also Downs v. Quallich, 90 Ohio App. 3d 799, 630 N.E.2d 775 (1993)
("logically" a cause and "may be relevant" inadequate).
32242 Ohio St. 2d 8,326 N.E.2d 252 (1975). Cf. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. B & B
Appliance Co., No. 54107,1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2870 (Cuyahoga County July 14,1988)
(expert's admission that he did not investigate other possible sources of a fire that
originated in a television set so negated his testimony as to permit a directed verdict).
323McDonald, 42 Ohio St. 2d at 8, 326 N.E.2d at 252.
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Shaw v. Toyotomi America, Inc.324 Conflicting expert testimony as to the cause
of a fire created a fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Teetors v. Benson Truck Bodies, Inc. 325 A third-party defendant, the
manufacturer of a cylinder hoist installed as part of a truck bed's lift system,
was entitled to summary judgment, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code sections
2307.73 and 2307.75, where the expert's affidavit failed to state a specific design
or manufacture defect in the cylinder as distinct from a possible defect in the
overall system.
Brooks v. Dunn.326 A motorcycle manufacturer was not entitled to summary
judgment where the affidavit in support failed to show personal knowledge of
the accident, the mechanical design of the motorcycle, or comparison to other
designs.
Bloomer v. Van-Kow Enterprises.327 Failure of the expert to offer evidence of
an economically and mechanically feasible alternative design justified
summary judgment.
Reliability:
American & Foreign Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co. 328 Expert testimony of
a theory relating to trip testing and trip time functions of a circuit breaker was
excluded as inadequate for lack of sufficient evidence as to how the expert
conducted his tests.
O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 329 Testimony that cataracts resulted
from overexposure to radiation at a nuclear power plant was rejected as not
based on scientific methodology and unsupported by scientific articles relied
upon by the expert.
State v. Thomas.330 A qualified expert's testimony as to results of DNA testing
was reliable. Such evidence is generally accepted by both the scientific
community and the courts.
324101 Ohio App. 3d 54, 654 N.E.2d 1337 (1995).
3 25No. S-93-9,1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 705 (Sandusky County Feb. 25,1994). No appeal
was taken from the grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer of a hydraulic
pump/valve, another component of the lift system, where the expert's affidavit was
flawed and he expressed "no opinion" as to a defect during his deposition. Shortest
deposition this author ever took.
32 6No. CA-2305, 1985 WL 4495 (Ohio Ct. App. Richland County Dec. 5,1985).
3 27No. 64970,1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1937 (Cuyahoga County May 5, 1994).
32845 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995).
32913 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). See also Conde v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1992), affd, 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1994)
(evidence based on questionable data or novel scientific theory).
33063 Ohio App. 3d 501, 579 N.E.2d 290 (1993).
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B. Circumstantial Evidence (Ohio Rev. Code section 2307.73(B))
A product may be destroyed at the time of an injury producing event or may
be lost or destroyed after that event without fault of the injured party. Absent
the allegedly defective product, direct evidence of the defect is unavailable. In
such cases a plaintiff is permitted to establish certain elements of a prima facie
case through the use of indirect or circumstantial evidence. The approach in
product liability litigation is distinct from, though similar to, some aspects of
res ipsa loquitur in negligence actions. Consistent with judicial precedent,33 1 the
Ohio Revised Code permits the use of indirect evidence to establish a product
defect when direct evidence is not available. This evidence must be otherwise
admissible under the Rules of Evidence. In such cases "it shall be sufficient for
the claimant to present circumstantial or other competent evidence that
establishes... that the product in question was defective ... .332
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,333 a well known decision
decided prior to the statutory rule, utilized this principle and expressed its
limitations as to the totality of the plaintiff's burden of proof. State Farm, the
insurer of a vehicle which was destroyed in a fire, brought an action against
Chrysler to recover its payment to the automobile owner. Expert witnesses
testified as to the probable ignition points, but could not identify the specific
defect that caused the fire. Chrysler argued that State Farm failed to
demonstrate the existence of a defect in the vehicle when it left the
manufacturer's control, which defect proximately caused the harm. Based on
a history of vehicle malfunction, the assertion that new cars do not have such
problems, and the expert testimony, plaintiff argued that its burden of proof
was met. In reaching a conclusion that the trial court's directed verdict was
appropriate, the court addressed the use of circumstantial evidence holding
that:.
Product defects may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Where direct evidence is unavailable, a defect in a manufactured
product existing at the time the product left the manufacturer may be
proven by circumstantial evidence where a preponderance of that
evidence establishes that the loss was caused by a defect and not other
possibilities, although not all other possibilities must be eliminated.
334
The court reasoned that, as applied to manufacturing defect cases and design
defect cases predicated on consumer expectancy, evidence of unsafe
unexpected performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a defect. In design
defect cases, but not manufacture defect cases, such evidence, in the absence
331 See, e.g., Friedman v. General Motors Corp., 43 Ohio St. 2d 209, 331 N.E.2d 702
(1975); State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891
(1973).
332 0HIO REV. CODE § 2307.73(B).
33337 Ohio St. 3d 1,523 N.E.2d 489 (1988).
3341d. at 6, 523 N.E.2d at 493-94.
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of a substantial change in the product, also supports the inference that the
defect existed at the time of manufacture. Thus, in manufacture defect cases,
plaintiff must present additional evidence to prove the defect existed at the
time of manufacture and to establish proximate cause. In design cases, plaintiff
must present additional evidence to establish proximate cause. Whether any
of the allowable inferences are appropriate in design defect litigation based on
risk-benefit analysis was not determined.
Efforts to establish a prima facie case of defect through circumstantial
evidence can also be made even though the product is available for inspection
and testing. This approach is often taken in "sudden acceleration" situations
where expert evidence cannot identify the cause of the acceleration. Although
courts may find that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise a jury
question, juries often reject such claims.335
Additional Decisions
Francis v. Clark Equipment Co.336 Plaintiff asserted that the absence of operator
restraints on a forklift established a product defect under both the consumer
expectancy and risk-benefit analysis standards. The court recognized that
under Ohio law evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is
sufficient to infer defect. This inference would have applied had the claim been
directed to the product's propensity to overturn. As the claim was directed to
the absence of a restraint system, further evidence was required to establish a
prima facie case of defect.
Harker v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.337 Plaintiff, who alleged an electrical
defect in a power tool, was not entitled to inferences based on circumstantial
evidence as she did not refute evidence which demonstrated a strong
likelihood that the defect was caused by conduct of either the decedent or
another family member.
Gast v. Sears Roebuck & Co.338 Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to raise
a jury question as to the existence of a defect in a television set that caused a
fire. The absence of expert testimony as to the precise cause of the defect did
not preclude the inference. Evidence that the television set was an "instant start"
model which meant there was always a current flow, expert testimony that the
335 See, e.g., Friedman, 43 Ohio St. 2d 209,331 N.E.2d 702 (2975) (a combination of expert
testimony and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to raise a jury question); O'Neill
v. Honda Motor Ltd., No. 220665 (Ohio C. P. Cuyahoga County 1994) (defense verdict).
[There is no opinion in this case. The citation is based on the author's personal
knowledge.]
336993 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1993). Cf. Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728
F.2d 784, 793-94 (6th Cir. 1984) (evidence of a subsequent design change in the bolt
pattern and bolts used to assemble a grain bin can be circumstantial evidence of a design
defect in the older design).
33 7No. 93-3273,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7439 (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 1994).
33839 Ohio St. 2d 29, 313 N.E.2d 831 (1974).
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fire "probably" started in the set, and recognition that defect free sets do not
ordinarily start fires, was sufficient.
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.339 As in State Farm, a
vehicle fire led to payment by an insurance carrier who sought recovery from
the vehicle manufacturer. Despite the extensive use of the vehicle (between
70,000 and 80,000 miles) and its age (a 1976 vehicle compared to a 1981 loss),
expert testimony that the fire started in the main electrical cable harness was
sufficient to permit a jury to infer that the defect existed at the time of vehicle
manufacture. The court reasoned that: "Afire breaking out underneath a dashboard
is a circumstance which cries out for explanation."340 This, alone, would permit the
jury to make certain inferences. When coupled with the expert testimony, it was
not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that the fire arose from a defect. In
essence, the court held that a directed verdict was improper as electrical
systems do not ordinarily start automobile fires and a consumer would
reasonably expect that this would not occur.
C. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Ohio Rule of Evidence 407 precludes evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in negligence actions. This preclusion is limited to evidence of
remedial measures offered to establish negligence or culpability rather than
identical evidence proffered for other purposes.3 41
In McFarland v. Bruno Machinery Corp.342 the court refused to extend the
wording of the Rule to strict liability actions. After evaluating the competing
33929 Ohio App. 3d 58, 502 N.E.2d 651 (1985). Accord Nash v. General Elec. Co., 64
Ohio App.2d 25, 410 N.E.2d 792 (1979) (circumstantial evidence, absent proof of
abnormal use or prior malfunction, allowed to infer defect in a five year old electric
toaster). Seealso Shea v. BASF Corp., No. 11-95-2,1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3264 (Paulding
County Aug. 8, 1995) (OHIo REV. CODE § 2307.73(B) would not apply to fill gaps as to
when or where herbicide contamination occurred); Potts v. Hawkes Hosp., No.
86AP-1146,1987 WL 11949 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin CountyJune 2,1987) (circumstantial
evidence that a normally functioning EKG machine does not cause bums raised a fact
issue of defect when plaintiff found a burn on her leg after the machine was attached to
her leg); Watkins v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, 16 Ohio Misc. 2d 11,477 N.E.2d 479 (C.P. 1984)
(despite plaintiff's affidavit that she did not tamper with or misuse an aerosol can which
exploded, res ipsa loquitur not available to prove defect).
340 Cincinnati Ins. Co., 29 Ohio App. 3d at 61; 502 N.E.2d at 654; quoting Vernon v.
Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 302,306 (Utah 1971).
34 1See, e.g., Worrell v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 94 Ohio App. 3d 133, 640 N.E.2d 531
(1994), where, in an action brought pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the court permitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures for impeachment
purposes. The bar of Ohio Rule of Evidence 407 is inapplicable to evidence offered for
purposes other than to show negligence or culpability. This holding is consistent with
the wording of the Rule which, by its terms, is inapplicable to evidence offered for other
purposes such as proving ownership, control, feasibilityof precautionary measures, and
impeachment.
34268 Ohio St. 3d 305, 626 N.E.2d 659 (1994). This decision effectively overrules
opinions limiting the use of subsequent repair or modification evidence in product
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policy interests, the court ruled that evidence of subsequent design changes
made to a die cutting press should have been presented to the jury on the
question of defect. The court reasoned that:
Such evidence would have been probative of the issue as to whether
the machine which caused the injury was safely designed. Proof that
Amtex placed a guard on the machine and that appellee changed the
design in order to prevent further injuries would be probative of the
quality of the machine prior to the time the remedial acts were taken.w3
Subsequent remedial measure evidence is admissible for any relevant
purpose in strict liability actions. The rule and reasoning of Bruno have equal
application to product liability claims brought pursuant to the Act.
D. Spoliation
Evidence, including an allegedly defective product, can be lost, disposed of,
or altered at any time from the date of injury through trial. Spoliation, the
destruction of evidence, constitutes a form of obstruction of justice. If spoliation
occurs before counsel is involved in the case both sides will have to deal with
the resulting evidentiary ramifications.34 When there is spoliation after
counsel is engaged, the ramifications can be even more serious. Typically, after
issue is joined counsel for the party that does not possess the product involved
(usually the defendant) will obtain a protective order to assure all necessary
protections such as maintaining the product in its existing condition and the
mutual witnessing of destructive testing.345
liability cases such as LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355
N.E.2d 533 (1976). LaMonica held that evidence of subsequent changes in product
design and state of the art was not admissible as proof of defect though admissible for
the limited purpose of showing that a feasible design alternative existed at the time of
manufacture. Contra Caggiano v. Medtronics, Inc., 47 Ohio App. 3d 29, 547 N.E.2d 389(1988) (Rule may be inapplicable to product liability actions as the purpose of the
prohibition, product improvement, is not advanced in such cases).
3 43McFarland, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 312; 626 N.E.2d at 664.
34 41n addition, an independent tort action for interference with, or destruction of,
evidence may be brought. See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 67 Ohio St. 3d 28, 615
N.E.2d 1037 (1993); Williams v. Dunagan, No. 15870, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2430
(Summit County May 5,1993).
34 5Breach of such an order can result in the preclusion of any evidence derived from
that breach or a dismissal of the action or defense. More limited sanctions will often be
applied. See generally Bright v. Ford Motor Co., 63 Ohio App. 3d 256, 578 N.E.2d 547
(1990). Courts sometimes disregard protective orders. For example, in a case
co-counseled by the author, Midwestern V.W. Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1973), a protective order barred destructive testing of a brake drum. Plaintiff's
expert violated the order yet the court admitted the result of his test into evidence. The
ruling was not addressed by the appellate court which rendered final judgment for the
defense based on the absence of proximate cause.
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The principles governing spoliation of evidence and available sanctions are
similar under both Ohio and federal law.346 Spoliation rules applicable in tort
actions are an extension of the principles initially applied to allowable
inferences following the destruction of documents and to the inference of guilt
permitted in criminal cases where evidence was destroyed. The foundation
principle was recognized in a wrongful death action.347 The court indicated
both when the doctrine applied and the effect of its violation:
[W]here relevant evidence which would properly be part of a case is
within the control of a party whose interest it would naturally be to
produce it, and he fails to do so, without satisfactory explanation, the
jury maydraw an inference that such evidence would be unfavorable
to him.A
Spoliation of evidence can result in a variety of sanctions including
preclusion of evidence or dismissal of an action or defense. Sanctions can be
applied whether the evidence was spoliated before or after a party had
knowledge that litigation was likely and without regard to malice. The
applicable sanction will depend on a balancing of the factors which led to the
spoliation, the prejudicial effect of allowing or excluding the evidence derived
from the spoliation, and other factors deemed relevant by the court. A primary
reason for possibly severe sanctions in product liability litigation is that loss of
the defective product "is catastrophic to the party who has been denied access
to it. '349
Additional Decisions
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp.350 Defendant sought to limit
the testimony of plaintiff's expert because the allegedly defective vehicle,
which caught fire, had been destroyed without providing defendant an
opportunity to inspect it in its "after the fire" condition. The trial court granted
a motion in limine which resulted in a summary judgment as plaintiff could
not introduce causation evidence. The court found that where evidence is
intentionally or negligently spoiled or destroyed by plaintiff's expert or his
counsel before the defense can examine it, a court may preclude any and all
346Federal rules are summarized in Tucker v. General Motors Corp., 945 F.2d 405 (6th
Cir. 1991). The history of the doctrine under Ohio law is summarized in Sullivan v.
General Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
347Hubbard v. Cleveland, Columbus, & Cin. Highway Inc., 81 Ohio App. 445, 76
N.E.2d 721 (1947) (the rule was found inapplicable on the facts of the case).
3481d., 81 Ohio App. at 451, 76 N.E.2d at 724 (quoting 20 Am. Jur. at 188).
349Travelers Ins. Co. v. Knight Elec. Co., No. CA-8979, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6664 at
*2 (Stark County Dec. 21,1992) (upholding preclusion of expert testimony and resulting
summary judgment even though there was no evidence of bad faith).
350No. 940T017, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4960 (Ottawa County Oct. 28,1994).
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expert testimony as a sanction for "spoliation of evidence."351 The plaintiff (in
this case) was under a duty to preserve evidence which he knew, or reasonably
should have known, was relevant to the action. As photographic evidence was
insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the destruction of
the evidence, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed.
Transamerica Insurance Group v. Maytag, Inc.352 The trial court's dismissal of
this subrogation action was reversed. The claim arose from a fire loss due to an
allegedly defective refrigerator power cord. The dismissal was predicated on
the fact that the product was destroyed before suit was commenced. Although
sanctions for spoliation can be imposed, the trial court erred by dismissing the
case where there was no evidence that the loss was attributable to the plaintiff.
The sanction must not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the infraction.
VI. OTHER CONCERNS
A. Choice of Law
By virtue of the fact that many products are sold and/or used across state
lines, there is frequently a potential for the substantive law of another state to
apply to actions brought in Ohio. This potential exists whether the action is
brought in a federal court or a state court. In either case, the determination of
which state's substantive law 353 applies will be governed by Ohio's choice of
law rules.35 4 Ohio began to limit the traditional approach of "lex loci delicti" in
351/d. at *8-9.
35299 Ohio App. 3d 203, 650 N.E.2d 169 (1994).
353Federal Rules of Procedure and Evidence apply in federal courts regardless of the
applicable substantive law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its
progeny. However, this is a complex area and the characterization process sometimes
casts specific Rules as substantive for choice of law purposes. A good example, though
not involving choice of law rules, is found in Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007 (6th
Cir. 1993), applying Ohio's substantive law to questions regarding the intentional tort
doctrine and the existence of a claim for fear of cancer, while applying federal rules of
procedure and evidence to issues such as consolidation and expert evidence. This rule
can sometimes apply to what are usually considered procedural rules or defenses. For
example, when a statute of limitations is considered part of the right, as distinct from a
traditional time bar, it will be deemed substantive. See, e.g., Nieman v. Press & Equip.
Sales Co., 588 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (applying the Colorado statute of repose,
contained in its Product Liability Act, as part of Colorado's substantive law).
354 Federal courts, when sitting in diversity actions, must apply the substantive law
of the state in which they sit including its choice of law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941); Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib.
Co., 814 F.2d 1120,1122 (6th Cir. 1987). Related principles of jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens often arise in cases involving choice of law issues. See, e.g., Salabaschew v.
TRW, Inc., 100 Ohio App. 3d 503,654 N.E.2d 387 (1995) (forum non conveniens); Sherry
v. Geissler U. Pehr GmbH, 100 Ohio App. 3d 67, 651 N.E.2d 1383 (1995) (jurisdiction);
Watson v. Driver Management, Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 509,646 N.E.2d 1187(1994) (forum
non conveniens).
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Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc.,355 where Ohio law was applied to resolve
an action brought by the Ohio administrator of an Ohio resident killed in an
automobile accident in Illinois. The court adopted a substantial governmental
analysis approach rather than the mechanical system called for by classical lex
loci rules. Application of this more modem approach allowed the court to
displace Illinois law.
Theoretical and practical distinctions between the rules of governmental
interest analysis, other rule systems, and the "significant relationship"
approach of the Restatement were resolved in Morgan v. Biro Manufacturing
Co.356 This case involved a product liability action seeking compensation for
injuries sustained by a resident of Kentucky while using a meat grinder during
his employment in Kentucky. The grinder was manufactured in Ohio by an
Ohio company. The court upheld application of the Kentucky Product Liability
Act through application of Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law section 146
and related sections. This approach applies the law of the state having the "most
significant relationship" to the action based on consideration and balancing of:
1. the place of injury;
2. the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
3. the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties;
4. the place where the relationship of the parties, if any, is located;
and
5. any factors contained in section 6 of the Restatement which the
court believes relevant.
Even if these principles call for application of foreign law, Ohio can refuse
to apply that law if it is repugnant to Ohio public policy.357
Additional Decisions
Charash v. Oberlin College.358 In this conversion action the court recognized
that Ohio choice of law rules are predicated on the Restatement approach and
that, therefore, lex loci is no longer the sole determinative factor.
35525 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971). Accord Schlitz v. Meyer, 29 Ohio St.2d
169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972).
35615 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984). See also Duvall v. TRW, Inc., 63 Ohio App.
3d 271, 578 N.E.2d 556 (1991) (contract and tort principles in conjunction with a motion
for national class certification).
35 7Moats v. Metropolitan Bank, 40 Ohio St.2d 47, 319 N.E.2d 603 (1974)
(administration of the estate of an Ohio decedent is of direct concern to Ohio and that,
therefore, application of the different law of Pennsylvania would violate legislative
policy). AccordJarvis v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 17 Ohio St. 3d 189,478 N.E.2d 786 (1985) (law
chosen by parties which is repugnant to Ohio policy will be given effect only if the
foreign state has a materially greater interest than Ohio). But see Auto-Owner's Ins. Co.
v. McMahon, 48 Ohio App. 3d 38, 548 N.E.2d 275 (1988), discussed infra at note 363.
35814 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Schlitz v. Meyer.359 This decision emphasizes the interests of Ohio as the
forum state. The court determined that Ohio law governed a tort action where
the accident occurred in Ohio even though all parties were non-residents.
Duvall v. TRW Inc.360 In this product liability action the court found, as one
of several reasons to deny class action status, that the Restatement approach
might result in the application of various foreign laws to non-Ohio residents
of the class.
Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Fryer.361 Decedent and his administratrix were
residents of Ohio. Decedent was killed in Pennsylvania through the negligence
of a Pennsylvania resident. Recovery was sought pursuant to uninsured
motorist provisions of a policy written in Ohio by a carrier whose principal
place of business was in Ohio. Applying the tort provisions of the Restatement,
including a presumption in favor of lex loci, the court held that Pennsylvania
law governed and that, therefore, the Ohio policy could be reached.
Eischen v. Baumer.362 The court applied Ohio law as lex loci does not govern
choice of law determinations where all parties to an accident which occurred
in Indiana were residents of Ohio.
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. McMahon.363 Michigan law was applied where
an accident occurred in Ohio but the injured parties were Michigan residents
with payments made by a Michigan insurance carrier. Unless Ohio has
significantly greater interest than the foreign state in having its own law
applied, Ohio law will not be applied to tort actions even when application of
a foreign law is repugnant to Ohio policy.
Barile v. University of Virginia.364 The court applied the Restatement approach
to determine that Virginia had the most significant relationship and that its law
of sovereign immunity barred the action of an Ohio resident who was injured
while playing football for the University.
B. Class Actions
The class action is a growing area for product liability litigation. Mass
produced products, of similar design or chemical composition with identical
warnings, instructions, and marketing approaches are naturals for class
certification efforts. Economic, practical, and tactical considerations may
support a class action claim despite its inherent expense and complexity. This
35929 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972).
36063 Ohio App. 3d 271, 578 N.E.2d 556 (1991).
36162 Ohio App. 3d 905, 577 N.E.2d 746 (1990). This opinion presents an interesting
analytical approach as the ultimate issue was one of contract law, but the action was
tort based.
36252 Ohio App. 3d 114,557 N.E.2d 142 (1988).
36348 Ohio App. 3d 38, 548 N.E.2d 275 (1988), relying on Sekeres v. Arbaugh, 31 Ohio
St. 3d 24, 508 N.E.2d 941 (1987).
36430 Ohio App. 3d 190, 507 N.E.2d 448 (1986).
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approach is well suited to actions seeking compensation for defective products
that will allegedly cause future harm without regard to present instances of
actual harm or where there have been limited instances of actual harm.365 Even
a cursory review of current developments reveals an extensive variety of
products, in addition to asbestos, DES, and silicone breast implants, that have
been subject to class action efforts. 366
Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
3 67
This complex Rule contains a set of standards which must be met to obtain class
certification. Rule 23(A) sets forth four prerequisites for a class action: (1)
numerosity; (2) common questions of law or fact; (3) typicality; and (4)
adequate class representation. In addition, subdivision (B) mandates that even
if subdivision (A) is met, there must also be either: (1) a risk of inconsistent
results absent class status; (2) a possibility that adjudication by individuals
would be dispositive of other parties' interests; (3) actions of a party opposing
the class which require final injunctive or declaratory relief; or (4) a
determination that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
Numerous Ohio decisions have addressed each of these prerequisites including
a substantial number of Ohio Supreme Court decisions.36
365See In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 23 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 424 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) (court rejecting class action
settlement proposal for side-saddle fuel tank system).
366See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Roror, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting class
certification for nationwide class of hemophilacs based on negligent handling of blood
products - HIV); In re Copley Pharmaceuticals Inc. Prod. Liab. Litig., 23 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 539 (D. Wyo. Apr. 25, 1995) (reaffirming class certification for harm
caused by the asthma drug Albuterol); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig.
23 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 378 (BNA) (E.D. La. Mar. 27,1995) (decertification of class
after rejection of proposed settlement); Miles v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 23
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 219 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,1995) (motion to certify national
class for penile implants); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
108 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 1995) (motion to clarify settlement of class action arising from
defective heart valves); Ware v. World Rio Corp., 23 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
67 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3,1995) (filing of class action against hair straightener manufacture for
alleged sores and hair loss); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engel, 24 Prod. Safety & Liab.
Rep. (BNA) 92 (Fla. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1996) (upholding state-wide class alleging illness
attributed to nicotine and smoking).
367The Ohio Rule, with the exception of minor word changes and the inclusion of
subdivision (F) (Aggregation of Claims), is identical to Rule 23 FED. R. Civ. P. Federal
law is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 471 U.S.
156 (1974). This section will focus on the substantive aspects of the Ohio Rule rather than
related procedural rules. Procedural aspects include such areas as whether a class
certification order is a final appealable order, Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 52
Ohio St. 3d 67, 555 N.E.2d 956 (1990) (certification is final order), contra Blumenthal v.
Medina Supply Co., 100 Ohio App. 3d 473, 654 N.E.2d 368 (1995); the standard of
appellate review, Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 200, 509 N.E.2d 1249 (1987);
and the effect of non-notice to a class member, Warner v. Waste Management, Inc., 36
Ohio St. 3d 91, 521 N.E.2d 1091 (1988).
36 8See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 556 N.E.2d
157 (1990)(Rule 23(B)(1)(a)); Warner v. Waste Management, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 91, 521
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One of the most well known and comprehensive product based decisions is
that of the Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland Board of Education v. Armstrong
World Industries.369 In this case fifty-four public school districts and
representatives of the Ohio Roman Catholic Diocese sought leave to intervene
and join the Cleveland Board of Education in a class action against the
manufacturers, distributors, installers, and others connected with the
installation of friable asbestos in school buildings throughout Ohio. The suit
sought damages for the cost of asbestos abatement as mandated by federal law.
After a certification hearing was held it was determined that the class, if
allowed, would include over 600 plaintiff entities. The court first noted that
class certification was not dependent upon the substantive merits of the action,
but upon compliance with the provisions of Rule 23(A) and (B). The court
found that the requirements of numerosity and commonality were met and
noted that commonality is satisfied even absent complete identity of claims. To
decide the question of typicality, the court first had to define the term. Rejecting
the claim that the presence of distinct defenses negated typicality, the court held
that this factor was met because the claims were "typical" of the class and did
not reflect adversity between class members. Adequacy of representation was
also met in that there was no evidence of collusion and no doubt as to the
professional competence of plaintiffs' counsel.
The ultimate decision illustrates the importance of Rule 23(B) for, despite
compliance with the four factors of Rule 23(A), the motion for class certification
was denied as outside the purview of Rule 23(B)(3). 370 Although
individualized determinations of damages do not alone negate class action
certification, here each class member was viewed as a building rather than a
school board. This distinction prohibited class certification.
Other differences also existed including, but not limited to: (1) identical
applications of asbestos products could be legally defective in one building and
not in another; (2) a given defendant's product could become friable in one
location and not another; (3) liability standards differed dependent upon the
status of given defendants; (4) different defenses existed as to various
defendants; (5) no single act of negligence or proximate cause was applicable
to each claim; and (6) legal duties differed in regard to warnings as they related
to state of the art. Use of a class action was not the most efficient and fair way
of proceeding when compared to other adjudicatory approaches. Efficiency
and fairness were unlikely to exist as over 4,600 building appraisals would be
needed with a possibility of 300,000 cross-examinations as to their accuracy, the
case might degenerate into multiple law suits separately tried, jury selection
N.E.2d 1091 (1988)(Rule 23(A)(1,2,4) and (B)(1)); Celebrezze v. Hughes, 18 Ohio St. 3d
71, 479 N.E.2d 886 (1985) (general); Schmidt v. AVCO Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 310, 473
N.E.2d 822 (1984) (Rule 23(A) and (B)); Ojalvo v. Board of Trustees, 12 Ohio St. 3d 230,
466 N.E.2d 875 (1984) (Rule 23(A)(2)); Vinci v. American Can Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 98, 459
N.E.2d 507 (1984) (Rule 23(A)(1-4) and (B)(3)).
36922 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 476 N.E.2d 397 (1985).
370Plaintiffs invoked no other provision of Rule 23(B).
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would be protracted as defendants might be entitled to 180 peremptory
challenges, jury instructions could be inadequate to prevent jurors from using
evidence improperly, and there would be adverse ramifications of having
jurors sit for an extended time frame. All things considered, the court reasoned
that:.
The invitation to declare a multi-plaintiff, multi-defendant, and
multi-product class creates an allure of a legal paradise where we may
all picnic together. This vision seems attractive from afar, but upon
closer inspection, is a quicksand upon which this Court will not
venture, for the result of such a step would be fear, panic and
confusion.
3 71
Additional Decisions
Jackson v. Glidden Co. 372 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
deferring a ruling on a motion to certify a class of children exposed to lead
through paint products pending resolution of a motion to dismiss. This was a
proper exercise of the court's power to control the litigation before it. As the
court reversed portions of the decision dismissing the entire action, it is likely
that a class certification ruling will ultimately be made.
Duvall v. TRW, Inc.373 The trial court abused its discretion in granting a
motion for class certification based on allegations of defects in the design and
manufacture of a steering gear box. As the proposed class was national,
plaintiffs had to establish a commonality of applicable law and failed in this
obligation. Despite the fact that TRW is headquartered in Cleveland, the court
found that there was no apparent benefit in basing the action in Ohio and that
there were extensive problems with case management for the proposed class.
Thus, this was not a superior method through which to adjudicate the
controversy as required by Rule 23(B)(3). The existence of sufficient fact
commonality was not enough to permit class certification.
Gilmore v. General Motors Corp.374 A motion to certify the claims of forty-six
plaintiffs asserting defects in Corvair automobiles manufactured from 1961-69
was denied. Neither the commonality requirement of Rule 23(A) nor other
requirements for class action certification were met.
VII. THE FUTURE AND CONCLUSION
For a plaintiff to prevail in a product liability claim is more difficult today
than in the decades of the 1970's and 1980's. This increased difficulty can be
attributed to several factors including more astute and better coordinated
3 71Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 27, 476 N.E.2d at 407.
37298 Ohio App. 3d 100, 647 N.E.2d 879 (1995).
37363 Ohio App. 3d 271,578 N.E.2d 556 (1991).
37435 Ohio Misc. 36, 300 N.E.2d 259 (Ohio C.P. 1973).
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defense efforts, a greater willingness of defense counsel and their clients to
bring a case to trial, increased financial costs to provide necessary testing and
expert testimony, and the influence of reform legislation. Paradoxically, at least
from the plaintiff's perspective, a significant reason why prevailing in a
product liability claim is more difficult is that manufacturers are making safer
products and consumers seem to have become more safety conscious and more
willing to pay for safety. To this extent a major goal of product liability law is
gradually being attained.
At the time this article was submitted for publication, House Bill 350 had
passed in the Ohio House and, with some amendments, in the Ohio Senate.
Governor Voinovich had indicated that he would sign the Bill into law. At this
time the Bill is before a conference committee which is expected to report out
on or before September 13, 1996. It is likely that the conference committee
proposal will be enacted prior to the November, 1997 election. Regardless of
the final form the Bill takes, it is evident that it will make the successful
litigation of a product liability claim somewhat more difficult than at the
present time. Moreover, it will require counsel to, once again, deal with distinct
bodies of law based on the effective date of the new Act and its relation to any
action.
The ramifications of the new law are both beneficial and detrimental. The
law will be beneficial as it will discourage frivolous actions which cost
manufacturers substantial sums to defend both in dollar amounts and in lost
productivity of key workers and executives. Many of these costs were, of
course, passed on to consumers. It will also allow for a more appropriate
determination of defect and provide other appropriate protection to
manufacturers. In part, however, the law will be detrimental. The legislation
will make it very difficult for injured parties, who have legitimate claims, to
proceed with those claims. A small number of possibly unfair, potentially
unconstitutional,375 provisions will prevent or limit some number of injured
parties from gaining full compensation where such recovery is justified.
Though on balance House Bill 350 is good legislation, its flaws detract from its
goal of setting a proper balance between the responsibilities of manufacturers
and those of consumers.
Unlike the prior Act, this legislation will establish new law rather than acting
primarily as a codification of existing law. As substantive laws cannot be given
retroactive effect, existing law will remain in effect for the many cases filed prior
to the ultimate effective date of an enacted House Bill 350. The new legislation
will, however, have a significant impact on future litigation. The major changes
contained in the House version of the Bill which are likely to be signed into law
include the following:
1. A two year statute of limitations coupled with a fifteen year statute of
repose including discovery provisions. Inclusion of this provision negates any
3 75See, Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. (forthcoming Jan. 1997).
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need to revisit the question of whether this Bill creates a statutory cause of
action subject to a longer limitation period.
2. Abrogation of the consumer expectancy definition of defect. All
manufacture and design defect claims will be considered exclusively under the
factors of risk/benefit analysis. As the consumer expectancy test is not needed
for manufacture defect determinations, and is inadequate for design defect
determinations, this change should prove beneficial.
3. Extension of the principles of comparative fault to product liability
claims. This change is long overdue and reflects the law of the majority of our
sister states. The provision also changes existing law by allowing the
contribution to harm of non-parties to be considered by the fact-finder. This
change eliminates various tactical questions that previously had an impact
upon designation of defendants and settlement efforts while ensuring that fact-
finder determinations can reflect the totality of injury causing factors. It
appears that assumption of the risk will remain a complete defense.
4. The doctrine of joint and several liability will be limited. Joint liability
will exist only when a defendant is more than fifty percent liable for the harm.
In such cases that defendant will be jointly and severally liable for economic
loss, but be only severally liable for non-economic loss. Any defendant less than
fifty percent at fault will be liable only for its share of the judgment. Although
strong arguments can be presented both for and against the total abrogation of
joint and several liability, this compromise, in comparison to existing law, more
accurately reflects fact-finder determinations. 376
5. Creation of a drug and alcohol abuse defense so that when a plaintiff's
substance abuse was a factor in bringing about an injury causing event while
that plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle, that conduct will be considered in
the calculus of causation. In such cases the substance abuse will be treated as
a presumptive cause of harm. This will have special impact in crashworthiness
litigation where the cause of the event has generally been deemed irrelevant.
It is a recognition that injury is caused by the joinder of product, user, and the
environment in which that product and user come together.
6. Modification of the laws relating to the effect of a release or judgment in
a personal injury action so that resolution of that action will preclude a
subsequent wrongful death action based on the same product defect or
exposure. The intent of this provision, though not clearly stated, is that it apply
only to situations in which the potential for death was recognized at the time
the personal injury action was resolved e.g., resolution of a claim for asbestosis
will preclude a subsequent claim for mesothelioma.
376Although this partial abrogation of joint and several liability where a comparative
fault finding has been made by the jury is consistent with prior Ohio law and parallels
similar approaches in several jurisdictions, it may raise constitutional issues. Merging
these doctrines can be viewed as a violation of either substantive due process or the right
to trial by jury under the Ohio constitution. Such a ruling would not be surprising in
light of the reasoning found in Ohio Supreme Court decisions invalidating various other
legislative efforts to limit tort liability as previously discussed herein.
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7. A limitation on the award of noneconomic damage awards.
Noneconomic loss caps are provided in a two tier system. Under the first tier,
such losses are limited to $250,000 or four times the amount of economic loss
to a maximum of $500,000. Under the second tier, the maximum becomes
$1,000,000 if standards as to the degree and permanence of injury or the effects
of injury are met. A constitutional challenge to the validity of this provision can
be expected.
8. A limitation on the award of punitive damages and related modification
of existing law. The changes include:
a. Before submitting the question of liability to the jury the trial
judge must determine, after a hearing, that based on clear and
convincing evidence a reasonable basis exists to support a
finding of malice or egregious fraud;
b. Bifurcation of the trial so that no issue of punitive damages can
be raised until there is a finding that a compensatory award
should be made;
c. Damages shall not exceed three times the total compensatory
award or $250,000 whichever is greater, but the court can
increase the award to a multiple of six;
d. Limitations on the award of multiple punitive damages based
on the same act or course of conduct; and
e. Expanding the governmental compliance standard, which
currently prevents imposition of punitive damages upon
ethical drug and device manufacturers, to include over the
counter drugs, medical devices, and other manufacturers.
A constitutional challenge to the validity of these provisions can be expected.
9. A limited abrogation of existing law precluding evidence of collateral
source payments. The fact-finder will be permitted, but not compelled, to
reduce judgment by the amount of collateral benefits received which are not
subject to subrogation and where plaintiff did not pay the premium to obtain
the benefit. This provision recasts a prior unconstitutional law in a manner that
appears to conform to the court's analysis of the former law's inadequacies.
10. The case law which now limits successor corporate liability is codified.
There is no such liability absent the existence of one of the four previously
recognized business oriented exceptions.
11. No industry wide or enterprise liability based claims predicated on the
joint awareness of risks associated with joint development of standards will be
permitted. Alternate liability remains as a cause of action provided that all
defendants are named and subject to jurisdiction. The limitations imposed are
strict as they preclude use of the doctrine where a defendant is unavailable
regardless of the reason for that absence.
The harshness of these limits does not appear to be mollified by creation of
a new cause of action for those injured by hazardous or toxic substances. To
succeed, the plaintiff must identify a specific defendant or defendants whose
conduct or action was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. This new
action does little more than recognize an existing cause of action and may be
more of a limiting than expanding liability factor.
12. A statutory equivalent to Evidence Rule 407 precludes use of
subsequent remedial measures as evidence that the measure made an event
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more or less likely to occur. Traditional exceptions to the exclusionary rule are
retained.
13. Evidence of a recall notification is admissible to establish that a defect
existed at the time of product manufacture upon a showing that the recall
addresses a defect which was the cause of harm. Non-compliance with a recall
notification is admissible to establish assumption of the risk or superseding
cause. Recall notification is also deemed relevant on the question of punitive
damages as it will be considered evidence that a manufacturer did not act in
flagrant disregard of safety.
Am. Sub. H.B. 350, in a form substantially similar to that discussed in
this article, was passed by the Ohio Senate on September 12,1996 and
by the Ohio House on September 26,1996. The Bill was signed by Ohio
Governor George Voinovich on October 28, 1996 and will take effect
ninety days after signature - January 26, 1997.
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